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INTRODUCTION
In 1999 a group of current and former Coca-Cola employees filed a
class action race discrimination suit against the soft drink maker.' One
month later, the company announced the creation of a "Diversity Advisory
Council" that would begin meeting with small groups of employees.'
Describing Coke as long supporting a diverse work force, Chairman M.
Douglas Ivester said that "there must be and will be no room for
discrimination in any form or of any kind against any employee."3 Cyrus
Mehri, the plaintiffs' attorney, characterized the Council's formation as a
welcome, albeit greatly overdue, development.4
Coca-Cola's executives and employee advocate Mehri, though
adversaries in that litigation, share a conviction worthy of careful scrutiny:
that employee education can prevent or at least greatly curb invidious
employment discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII")5 and other civil rights statutes. This belief, widely
held and rarely questioned, has spawned a multi-billion dollar sexual
harassment and diversity training industry staffed by consultants,
management attorneys, and human resource professionals who offer
1. Dan Morse, Coca-Cola Co. Plans to Form Diversity Panel, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1999, at A8.
The suit ultimately settled for a record $192.5 million. Barney Tumey, Race Discrimination: Coca-Cola
Agrees to Pay $192.5 Million, Make HR Policy Changes to Settle Lawsuit, DAILY LAB. REP., Nov. 17,
2000, at AAI.
2. Morse, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id. Mehri also voiced concern that the Council's work could intimidate employees who are
considering joining the law suit. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
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programs aimed at litigation prevention.6 Yet, while much money is being
made by trainers and spent by employers,' there is no empirical support for
the premise behind the instruction-that it fosters employee tolerance and
greatly alters workplace culture.
Even more troubling is the Supreme Court's recent embrace of anti-
discrimination training as a doctrinal and jurisprudential component of Title
VII's substantive law. In two landmark sexual harassment cases decided in
1998, 8 both of which created an employer affirmative defense to suit, 9 the
Court characterized the preventative purpose of Title VII as encouraging
employers to promulgate new policies, such as employee grievance
procedures. Grievance procedures, the Court noted, could prevent
discrimination by "encourag[ing] employees to report harassing conduct
before it becomes severe and pervasive."'" In 1999, the Court made clear
that its vision of Title VII as expressly encouraging personnel policy
creation encompasses an educational component as well. In Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n the Court created a safe harbor from punitive
damages for employers if they "adopt anti-discrimination policies and...
educate their personnel on Title VII's prohibitions.""II
In short, the Court has elevated the common corporate practice of anti-
discrimination training to the level of an affirmative defense in sexual
harassment cases and a mechanism for limiting damages in discrimination
cases where punitive damages are sought.'2 The Court has justified these
doctrinal changes in the name of discrimination prevention. However, as
will be discussed below, there is no reason to believe that an educational
approach to discrimination deterrence can succeed in eliminating
discrimination.
6. One study indicates that an increasing number of employers are conducting training on
employment-related litigation matters for the purpose of litigation prevention. A survey of human
resource managers conducted jointly by the Society for Human Resource Management and the
management law firm of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman found that 55 percent of 353 survey
respondents reported that "their organizations provide training on employment-related matters to both
managers and supervisors." See More Employers Taking Actions to Address Threat of Lawsuits, Says
HR Manager Survey, DAILY LAB. REP., June 29, 1999, at A2.
7. It is estimated that at least $10 billion is spent annually on corporate diversity training
designed to alter employee attitudes deemed incompatible with increasingly multi-cultural work
environments. Seth Lubove, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 122.
Consultants' annual revenue from sexual harassment training is thought to be similarly great. Stuart
Silverstein, Fear of Lawsuits Spurs the Birth of New Industry, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1998, at Al.
8. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
9. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
10. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
11. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
12. Of course, training will typically be asserted as merely one facet of an employer's defense.
Employers will also note, for example, that they maintained express policies against discrimination and
harassment.
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The introduction of employee education into the realm of civil rights
jurisprudence signals the need for a thorough understanding of the impact
of such programs. Focusing on what little is known of the effects of sexual
harassment and diversity training on employees, this Article questions the
wisdom of a reflexive and undiscerning view of these employer efforts by
the Court and the legal profession as a whole. Management attorneys
proclaim the virtues of diversity and sexual harassment training when there
is almost no evidence that it is effective. 3 Plaintiffs' attorneys are helping
to make diversity training a common component of discrimination law suit
settlements and consent decrees, simply assuming that it will bring about
cultural change as a matter of course. 4 Without paying much attention to
program details, judges increasingly treat sexual harassment training as
evidence that the employer acted reasonably to remedy harassment or to
maintain a discrimination-free work environment and thus conclude the
employer should not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its
supervisors. 5
Unlike the legal profession, social scientists, disturbed by a glaring
lack of empirical research on the effects of anti-discrimination training,
urge caution in the endorsement of such programs.16 Brief or "one shot"
training efforts may not affect employee attitudes or actions in the least. 7
Moreover, mounting anecdotal evidence indicates that at least some
programs produce a polarizing effect on employee attitudes. For example,
training may reinforce stereotypes about groups and inspire animosity
between employees who, as part of the course, are encouraged to reveal
their true feelings.18 And despite the dearth of data on training outcomes,
13. E.g., C. Geoffrey Weirich et al., Employer Strategies for Avoiding the Mega-Verdict: Learning
from Recent High-Profile Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, in 26TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 31, 41 (Practicing Law Institute, 1997) (advocating diversity training); Gary R.
Siniscalco & Jeffrey D. Wohl, Discrimination Can be Costly: Avoiding the "Texaco" Problem, CAL.
LAW., Nov. 1997, at 27 (advocating diversity training); Garry G. Mathiason & Mark A. de Bernardo,
The Emerging Law of Training, FED. LAW., May 1998, at 24, 31 (recommending sexual harassment
training); Charles A. Shanor & Leslie A. Dent, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 485, 511-12 (1994)
(recommending sexual harassment training); Eric Wallach & Stacey Creem, Handling Sexual
Harassment Charges in the Workplace, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE REP., Oct. 1996, at 16 (advising that
employers develop a comprehensive sexual harassment education program); Greenebaum Doll &
McDonald PLLC, Tips to Avoid Litigation for Workplace Harassment, 3 KY. EMPL. L. LETrER 5 (1998)
(recommending periodic training sessions on harassment).
14. See infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
17. See Catherine Ellis & Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, Diverse Approaches to Managing Diversity, 33
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 79, 83 (1994) (noting that brief programs can actually cause tension among
employee groups).
18. Michael Delikat, The Texaco Case and Lessons to Learn: How Can Corporations Manage
Diversity Effectively? in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1997 181, 203-06
(Practicing Law Inst. 1997).
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one study did identify sexual harassment seminars as prompting fears on the
part of senior men about offering crucial mentoring to young professional
women. 19
Beyond these important concerns, however, is the larger question of
the significance of the developing jurisprudence of education and
prevention in employment discrimination law. There is a disturbing trend
in civil rights law toward acceptance of legal compliance in form rather
than substance. Several recent studies illustrate this phenomenon.
Sociologists Lauren Edelman, Christopher Uggen, and Howard Erlanger,
for example, demonstrate that corporate equal employment opportunity
("EEO") grievance procedures are presently accepted by courts as "the
primary symbol of nondiscrimination."2 Yet these procedures, long touted
as mechanisms for avoiding liability by personnel professionals and defense
attorneys, may actually undermine the legal rights of employees. 2' More
specifically, the willingness of some courts to defer to procedures that lack
due process protections and the full panoply of remedies existing under
Title VII raises grave concerns about the ability of grievance procedures to
vindicate employee rights.22
Moreover, this author has described the tendency of those reviewing
employment decisions for possible discrimination-including courts,
agencies, and plaintiffs' lawyers-to accept employer created performance
documentation at face value. 23 The increasing sophistication of employers
in safeguarding their employment decisions from challenge, however, may
mask subtle forms of discrimination and adversely impact Title VII's
overall effectiveness.24
Finally, a recent study of lower courts' interpretation and application of
the Supreme Court's 1998 landmark sexual harassment affirmative defense
established in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth25 and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,2 6 revealed a judiciary rigidly and narrowly construing the
Supreme Court's directive.27 Linda Hamilton Krieger, Shawna Parks, and
19. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the
Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 376-77 (1995).
20. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406, 407 (1999).
21. See id. at 448-49.
22. See id. at 449.
23. E.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding Employer
Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 1, 7 (1999).
24. See id. at 4.
25. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
26. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
27. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, et al., Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Normative,
Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions (paper presented at Law & Society Association Annual Meeting,
Miami, 2000), at 30-52.
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Priya Sridharan found that establishment of a sexual harassment complaint
procedure coupled with a plaintiff's failure to report harassment virtually
ensures an employer "victory at the summary judgment stage."28  The
courts' uninformed, form-over-substance approach stands in sharp contrast
to empirical data indicating that victims of harassment are unlikely to lodge
formal complaints. 9
An uncritical embrace of anti-discrimination training likewise runs the
risk of further facilitating the trend exposed by those recent studies. At
stake is the ultimate shape and composition of the post-affirmative action
workplace. If equality is to be more than cosmetic-indeed, if Title VII's
preventative purpose is to be fulfilled-courts must look beyond symbols to
determine whether the environment in which a plaintiff worked was
actually discriminatory. In the case of training, it therefore follows that
meaningful evaluation of the quality and effects of a training regimen is
necessary before judicial approval is bestowed upon the program. The
symbolic gestures of employers in providing diversity and sexual
harassment training, no matter how well intentioned, are poor substitutes
for searching inquiry into the particulars of a given workplace.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II traces the evolution of the
jurisprudence of education and prevention from its roots in 1970s Supreme
Court case law. Part II reveals a dramatic shift in judicial philosophy by
comparing the Court's early activist-oriented descriptions of Title VH's
prophylactic purpose to the Court's recent expressions of the law's
preventative aim.3" Part III places the shift in Title VII jurisprudence in
context. Using Lauren Edelman's theory of legal endogeneity, which posits
that organizations subject to Title VII have actively constructed the terms of
legal compliance, Part III details the extensive training efforts undertaken
by employers over the last two decades. It then discusses the ready
embrace of training programs by the legal profession.
Part IV demonstrates that the Supreme Court's faith in discrimination
education and prevention may well be misplaced. It describes the possible
negative effects of such educational efforts as indicated by empirical studies
and anecdotal accounts.3 The Article concludes in Part V by urging
attorneys and judges to develop a sophisticated appreciation for the uses
and limitations of anti-discrimination training. Employers, in order to use
28. Id. at 32-33.
29. See id. at 52; It is possible, of course, to provide a more optimistic assessment of these
employment practices. Susan Sturm, for example, sees great promise in the emerging, private regulatory
approach taken by some employers to the problems of sexual harassment and glass ceiling issues. See
generally, Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
COLUMBIA L.R. (forthcoming 2001).
30. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 223-349 and accompanying text.
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employee training as a mechanism for avoiding or limiting punitive
damages, should be required to demonstrate the effectiveness of their
programs.
11.
EVOLUTION OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EDUCATION AND PREVENTION
The roots of the new jurisprudence of education and prevention lie in
the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Albemarle Paper v. Moody.3" That
decision, which set forth the standards trial courts should use in deciding
whether to award back pay to Title VII plaintiffs, described two objectives
of anti-discrimination law: compensation and prevention. Regarding
compensation, the Court held that Congress, by granting to courts equitable
remedial powers, clearly envisioned that discrimination victims would be
made whole for their injuries.33
Title VIl's "primary objective," however, was "prophylactic."34
Workplace equality was to be achieved by employers proactively
scrutinizing their employment policies to identify and eliminate those of
"dubious legality."3 As a potential remedy, back pay advanced this goal
instrumentally by acting as a stimulus for employer self-evaluation. Thus,
discrimination was to be prevented by employers purging their own
workplaces of biased policies without the necessity of litigation or judicial
intervention.
For over two decades, the basic understanding of anti-discrimination
law's deterrent goal remained markedly unchanged. For example, in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,36 the Court described retroactive
seniority as a remedy consonant with Title VIl's prophylactic objective
because it would catalyze employers' examination of potentially illegal
policies.37 In Connecticut v. Teal" the Court rejected an employer's so-
called "bottom line" defense to a suit challenging its use of a promotion
exam that disproportionately screened out minority candidates39 on the
grounds that allowing the biased exam to stand would offend the statute's
32. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
33. Id. at 418 (referencing Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
34. Id. at 417.
35. Id. at 417-18.
36. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
37. Id. at 364-65.
38. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
39. The employer in that case argued that it should not be liable for discrimination caused by the
disparate impact of a promotional examination on minority candidates because the "bottom line" of its
selection process was an appropriate racial balance between those who applied and those who were
promoted. 457 U.S. at 440-41.
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deterrent aim.n" Similarly, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing4'
the Court held that after-acquired evidence of a discrimination victim's
misconduct cannot bar recovery in every instance because such a result is
antithetical to the deterrence policy of anti-discrimination law.4" In other
words, if subsequently discovered victim wrongdoing always prohibited
victim recovery, the incentive for employer self-evaluation would be
undermined.
In 1986, however, the Court decided a sexual harassment case that laid
the groundwork for the recent shift in the jurisprudence of deterrence under
Title VII. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson," the Court for the first time
recognized that unwelcome sexual advances that create a hostile work
environment violate Title VII.4 As important as that ruling is, it is actually
dicta in the opinion that provides the basis for a new understanding of the
prophylactic purpose of anti-discrimination law. Justice Rehnquist, in a
section of the opinion discussing employer liability for hostile work
environment harassment, directly addresses an interesting argument posited
by the defense. The bank argued that its anti-discrimination policy and the
victim's failure to use an established employee grievance procedure to
complain about her supervisor's harassment should insulate it from
liability.45
Justice Rehnquist rejected the employer's argument, noting that the
bank's anti-discrimination policy did not specifically discuss sexual
harassment. Moreover, the grievance procedure required that the employee
complain directly to her supervisor, an action most victims would be
reluctant to take when the harassment perpetrator is that very same
supervisor." Rehnquist did note, however, that the bank's defense would
be far "stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage
victims of harassment to come forward. . . ."I' This observation implicitly
suggests that employers can deter discrimination by doing something other
than eliminating discriminatory policies: employers can adopt affirmative
policies that make clear their abhorrence of discrimination and provide
mechanisms for preventing or minimizing it when it occurs.
After Vinson many courts referenced sexual harassment policies and
grievance procedures in the decisions they rendered, but few acknowledged
that the Court's nudge toward policy and procedure promulgation
40. Id. at 448-49.
41. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
42. Id. at 358-59.
43. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
44. See id. at 65.
45. See id. at 70-73.
46. See id. at 73.
47. Id.
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constituted a new conceptualization of the prophylactic aim of Title VII.
One exception was the Third Circuit's decision in Bouton v. BMW of North
America.48 In Bouton, the Third Circuit characterized the "choice whether
to permit a grievance procedure to alleviate liability" as one directly tied to
the goal of "deterrence."49 An employer's ability to rely on a grievance
procedure as a liability shield, stated the court, is justified by an expected
decrease in aggrieved employees resorting to litigation.50 This perceptive
opinion notwithstanding, after the Supreme Court's twin sexual harassment
decisions in 1998, it is clear that a new understanding of Vinson and a new
direction in employment discrimination jurisprudence has emerged.5'
The Supreme Court's opinions in Ellerth52 and Faragher"3 were hailed
by employer and employee advocates alike.54 Both cases addressed an issue
that had long vexed the lower courts. Specifically, the Ellerth and
Faragher opinions answered the question of how to determine employer
liability for harassment perpetrated by a supervisor.
Using principles of agency law, the Court divided sexual harassment
cases into two categories: those in which a supervisor has taken a "tangible
employment action against the subordinate"55 and those in which no such
action has occurred.56 In the former category, vicarious liability is always
appropriate because the ability to change a subordinate's employment status
is by definition aided by the existence of the agency relationship between
the supervisor and the employer.
In the latter case, if there has been no definitive action like a firing or
demotion, the assistance a supervisor receives by virtue of the authority
delegated to him or her by the employer is less clear. Vicarious liability for
the supervisor's harassment, stated the majorities in both cases, should
therefore be more limited. To facilitate that limitation, the Court fashioned
an affirmative defense for employers faced with claims in this category.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Ellerth, notes:
48. 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 110.
50. See id.
51. For example, after the Supreme Court's 1998 decisions, the Fifth Circuit, citing one of them,
described Meritor's approach to employer liability as "further[ing] the twin deterrent and compensatory
aims of Title VI." Indest v. Freeman Decorating, 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999).
52. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
53. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
54. E.g., Rebecca Ganzel, What Sexual Harassment Training Really Prevents, TRAINING, Oct. 1,
1998, at 86, (noting "many corporations hailed with relief the Supreme Court's June 26 rulings")
available in 1998 WL 14109043, at *2; Linda Greenhouse, Court Spells Out Rules for Finding Sex
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1998, at Al (noting "[t]he rulings won praise across a broad
spectrum of both management and civil rights groups...").
55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
56. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
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The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.57
Employers need not always prove that they had an anti-harassment
policy and complaint procedure to claim the defense. The necessity for
such prophylactic devices, however, "may be appropriately addressed when
litigating the first element of the defense."58 Moreover, while the plaintiff
employee's failure to use a complaint procedure is not the only way to
establish the second prong of the defense, "a demonstration of such failure
will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden."59
While agency principles form part of the justification for the new
affirmative defense, Justice Kennedy found additional considerations
implicit in Vinson. Elucidating a new understanding of the preventative
aim of Title VII, Kennedy notes in a striking passage that the statute "is
designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms."'6 To the extent these policies act as incentives for
employees to report harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive,
Kennedy notes that limiting vicarious liability advances "Title VII's
deterrent purpose."'"
This conceptualization of discrimination prevention is a far cry from
that offered by the Albemarle Court. Under Albemarle and its progeny, the
fear of money damages inspires employers to purge the workplace of
discriminatory policies and practices.62 Under Ellerth, fear of liability
motivates employers to create policies that victims must use or forfeit their
right to recover for harm caused by discrimination. The term "prevention"
is thus aligned with the kinds of litigation prevention techniques long
recommended by defense attorneys and human resource professionals.
Indeed, these professionals began recommending grievance procedures as
litigation avoidance mechanisms beginning in the early 1980s, before
Vinson was decided.63
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Faragher, likewise
referenced anti-discrimination law's deterrent aim in discussing the new
affirmative defense. 64 Citing Albemarle, Justice Souter re-characterized the
57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
58. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
59. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
60. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
63. Edelman et al., supra note 20, at 412-13.
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
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prophylactic purpose of Title VII, stating that the primary objective of the
statute is "to avoid harm."65  This rather anemic assertion of statutory
purpose stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's earlier declaration
that the "'primary objective' of Title VII is to bring employment
discrimination to an end ....
Gone is the image from Albemarle of employers stamping out
workplace discrimination when it occurs. In its stead, Souter provides the
figure of a benevolent employer "informing employees of their right to raise
and how to raise the issue of harassment. '67 Like Kennedy, Souter' s vision
of prevention focuses on policy creation. Unlike Kennedy's vision, it
appears also to incorporate instruction. It is not enough for an employer to
promulgate a sexual harassment policy. The policy must also be
disseminated and its contents communicated to employees. In fact failure
to distribute an existing policy precluded the defendant in Faragher from
raising the affirmative defense on remand.68
Late in the 1998-1999 term, Justice O'Connor provided the clearest
articulation to date of the new jurisprudence of education and prevention.
In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n69 the Court grappled with the
standards under which employers may be liable for punitive damages in
discrimination cases.70 Providing a literal interpretation of the language of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made available to intentional
discrimination victims compensatory and punitive damages,7 the majority
held that Title VII plaintiffs must show that an employer acted with malice
or reckless indifference before obtaining punitive damages.72 The Court
rejected the D.C. Circuit's interpretation that egregious misconduct by the
employer must be shown before a jury may consider a punitive damage
award.
73
In a portion of the opinion joined by four other justices, however,
O'Connor provided employers with a shield from punitive damages if they
"engage in good faith efforts to comply" with Title VII. 7 1 Moreover, she
specifically referenced anti-discrimination policies and programs as the
65. Id.
66. Ford Motor Company v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982).
67. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting 29 CFR § 1604.11(f)(1997)).
68. See id. at 806-09.
69. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
70. For interesting discussions of Kolstad, see Robert Belton, The Employment Law Decisions of
the 1998-99 Term of the Supreme Court: A Review, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 183, 199-207
(1999); Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of Vicarious Liability
for Title Vii Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799, 828 (2000).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(1) & (b)(1).
72. Kolstad, 527 U.S. 534 (1999).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 544.
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kind of good faith efforts a court may look to in deciding whether the shield
should apply. A liability rule that reduces the incentive for employers to
undertake such preventative steps, noted O'Connor, is contrary to the
prophylactic purpose of Title VII.75 Just as the law promotes effective
sexual harassment policies and grievance procedures, so too does it
encourage employers "to adopt anti-discrimination policies and to educate
their personnel on Title VII's prohibitions."76 Thus, the new approach to
punitive damage liability aims to deter discrimination by promoting
preventative efforts, specifically, policy promulgation and employee
education.
That O'Connor's articulation of the prophylactic purpose of Title VII
pays such homage to employer anti-discrimination policies and educational
programs is not surprising. Amicus curiae briefs were filed in Kolstad by
three organizations with huge stakes in anti-discrimination training: the
Society for Human Resource Management ("SHRM"),77 the Chamber of
Commerce,78 and the Equal Employment Advisory Council ("EEAC").29
The last organization, the EEAC, describes its members as "firmly
committed to training, awareness, and compliance programs designed to
ensure that all their employment actions are carried out in accordance with
Title VII... "80
The EEAC brief forcefully notes that most large corporations "provide
regular, ongoing training to ensure that their managerial, supervisory, and in
appropriate instances even non-supervisory personnel, are aware of Title
VII and other employment related laws" and describes as "anomalous" any
interpretation of Title VII that would subject such employers to punitive
damages.8' Similar support for the "safe harbor proposal" is found in the
SHRM brief. That brief advocates the safe harbor because it "rewards
employers that take preventative measures" such as "effective EEO
training."82 The views and practices of litigation avoidance professionals
were before the Court, and O'Connor's rendition of Title VII's preventive
aim places on those practices a judicial stamp of approval.
The ultimate effect of the Court's new approach is of course not yet
known. One might safely assume, however, that the new jurisprudence of
75. Id. at 545 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
76. Id.
77. Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management, Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
78. Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
79. Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council , Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
80. Id. at*l.
81. Id.
82. SHRM brief, supra note 77, at * 12.
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education and prevention will find application beyond the issue of whether
employers should be liable for punitive damages. Thus, it is both
interesting and important to analyze the turn that the jurisprudence has
taken. As noted above, the Court's sense of the preventative purpose of
anti-discrimination law did not develop in a vacuum. Indeed, it is the
product of decades of efforts by those organizations subject to employment
laws to produce compliance practices that help them avoid running afoul of
Title VII. Whether and when these practices actually deter and eliminate
discrimination will be discussed herein. Initially, however, it is necessary
to examine the training programs undertaken by employers, as well as the
legal profession's hearty embrace of them.
III.
THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTEXT: REGULATION BY THE REGULATED
Understanding the turn taken by civil rights jurisprudence toward
education and prevention requires looking at the responses of those subject
to civil rights law. It simply is not the case, as Elinor Schroeder suggests,
that the Supreme Court has sua sponte decided to engage in "regulation by
personnel policy."83 Rather, it is the organizations covered by civil rights
law that have devised legal compliance strategies, like anti-discrimination
training programs, that the Supreme Court has subsequently incorporated
into Title VII doctrine.
Sociologists have been able to document an impressive range of
employer-initiated policy innovations since the passage of Title VII in
1964.84 Responding to the ambiguity in civil rights legislation, which
prohibits discrimination but does not require specific employment actions
beyond that, organizations acted to demonstrate their adherence to
principles of equality and to the law itself.8" The compliance structures
created include: nonunion grievance procedures,86 EEO and affirmative
action offices,87 formal promotion mechanisms,88 and employment at-will
clauses designed to forestall wrongful discharge suits.89  Anti-
83. See Elinor P. Schroeder, Regulating the Workplace Through Mandated Personnel Policies, 48
U. KAN L. REV. 593, 600 (2000).
84. Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson, Symbols and Substance in Organizational
Response to Civil Rights Law, 17 RES. IN SOC. STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY 107, 108 (1999).
85. See id. at 107-08.
86. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of
Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1990).
87. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of
Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531 (1992).
88. Frank Dobbin et al., Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor Markets,
99 AM. J. Soc. 396 (1993).
89. John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Uncertainty in
U.S. Firms, 1955-1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794 (1996).
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discrimination training has long been a part of the organizational response.9
Lauren Edelman and her colleagues recently provided strong support
for the theory that the process of regulation in the civil rights area is
endogenous. 91 Rather than view law as an outside force imposed upon
organizations, their theory of legal endogeneity posits that the "content and
meaning of law is determined by [the organizations] it is designed to
regulate. '92 Edelman and her colleagues argue that employers and their
advocates actively create the definition of legal compliance with anti-
discrimination law and that courts, over time, legitimate those efforts by
making them relevant to the determination of liability.93 The authors use
EEO grievance procedures, a common litigation prevention tool, as an
example of this process.
The study's review of business and professional journals revealed that
in the late 1970s and early 1980s human resource professionals and
management attorneys began making claims that grievance procedures
would shield employers from liability for discrimination.94 At that time,
however, there was almost no legal support for such an assertion. 95 In fact,
few discrimination cases before the mid-1980s even mention grievance
procedures.96
Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Vinson of the grievance procedure
defense proffered by the bank provided a big boost for the claim that a
grievance procedure could forestall liability. 97  From that point on,
employers began increasingly to raise grievance procedures as a bar to
liability, and lower courts increasingly began to defer to their arguments.98
Twelve years after the Court's decision in Vinson, the grievance procedure
defense was fully incorporated into sexual harassment doctrine in the
Ellerth and Faragher decisions discussed above.99 Thus, those subject to
anti-discrimination law, through their responses to it, defined a form of
legal compliance ultimately recognized and legitimated by the judiciary."0
There are problems however, with allowing those parties constrained
by a law to define its terms. Grievance procedures, for example, may
actually undercut the legal rights of the employees who use them.'0 '
90. Edelman, supra note 86, at 1435.
91. Edelman, supra note 20, at 406-07.
92. Id. at 407.
93. Id. at 409.
94. Id. at 412-13.
95. Id. at 432.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 434-35.
98. Id. at 439.
99. Id. at 435-36.
100. See id. at 436.
101. Id. at 449.
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Edelman and her colleagues warn that the absence of due process
protections, the lack of the full panoply of remedies available in litigation,
and the propensity of complaint handlers to recast complaints as managerial
problems rather than instances of discrimination may adversely affect the
claims of grievants. 10 2 Moreover, employees may be legitimately concerned
about retaliation or decision maker bias and decide not to use such
procedures.1"3 If courts uncritically accept grievance procedures, without
understanding the subtle organizational context in which they are located,
"legal ideals may be compromised."' 4
Anti-discrimination training nicely fits the endogeneity model because
it is an example of organizations actively creating the terms of legal
compliance and judicial deference to those efforts. Employee education has
been promoted as a litigation prevention mechanism for at least two
decades 1°5 and has found its ultimate approval in the Kolstad decision. The
Supreme Court has accepted on faith the claims of legal and personnel
professionals that classroom techniques can eliminate or greatly curb
invidious discrimination. Whether those claims are well founded will be
taken up below. First, however, Subsection A extends the discussion by
describing the extensive training efforts made by employers. Subsection B
then reviews the ready embrace of such programs by the legal profession as
a whole. Two popular forms of anti-discrimination education are
considered: sexual harassment training and diversity training.
A. The Sum and Substance of Anti-Discrimination Training Programs
Anti-discrimination training has been considered part of the
employer's litigation prevention arsenal for at least twenty years. As one
early training advocate noted, "[t]he key to reducing an employer's
exposure to unjust dismissal and other employment-related litigation is
supervisor training."10 6 By 1990 anti-discrimination seminars were quite
common, a fact noted in Lauren Edelman's seminal study of the spread of
formal grievance procedures for non-union employees. 10 7 Two ubiquitous
types of anti-discrimination training, sexual harassment workshops and
diversity training, are the focus of this section.
102. Id. at 448-49; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497 (1993).
103. Edelman, supra note 20, at 448-49; see also Krieger, supra note 27, at 19.
104. Edelman, supra note 20, at 449.
105. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
106. Susan G. Tanenbaum, Advanced Strategies in Employment Law, in LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 483, 515 (Practicing Law Inst., 1987).
107. Edelman, supra note 86, at 1435 (noting that respondents in the study "repeatedly emphasized
the value of... workshops" that "demystify" Title VII and teach supervisors techniques that make it
more likely that an organization "will prevail in lawsuits.").
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Sexual harassment training typically has three integrated components.
First and foremost, the workshops are designed to educate employees about
applicable law. 108  Next, the programs also function to disseminate
information about the particular employer's sexual harassment policy and
grievance procedure.' 09 Finally, training often aims to sensitize employees
about permissible and prohibited behavior."0  Those attending sexual
harassment seminars are frequently shown videotaped vignettes and engage
in role-playing and discussions of the course material."'
Diversity training programs vary greatly in format. Nonetheless, two
basic approaches exist. The first approach focuses on laws and policies." 2
Typically aimed at managers, these workshops explain and provide
compliance instruction on applicable civil rights laws." 3
The second approach focuses on increasing trainees' sensitivity to
issues of "difference." Seminars attempt to raise consciousness on "what
it's like to be misunderstood, undervalued and stereotyped at work.""' 4
Many such programs begin with an "audit" or "scan" of the company's
culture.' The audit involves interviewing or surveying employees and
reviewing corporate data to determine the values perpetuated by the
organization's formal and informal practices. Trainers sometimes
administer standard personality tests to employees as well."
6
Following the audit, training sessions are conducted during which
employees watch videos, play games, and discuss their feelings about
subjects such as race and gender stereotyping."' The sessions are supposed
108. See Wallach & Creem, supra note 13, at 16; Mathiason & de Bernardo, supra note 13, at 31.
109. See Wallach & Creem, supra note 13, at 16, Mathiason & de Bernardo, supra note 13, at 31.
110. See Donald R. Livingston, Current Developments in Sexual Harassment Law, in THE
TWELFTH ANNUAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY UPDATE 211, 229-30 (Georgetown Univ. Law
Center, 1994); Jay W. Waks, Curbing Sexual Harassment in the Firms, in THE THIRD ANNUAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW & LITIGATION CONFERENCE 131, 135 (Law Journals Seminars-Press, 1994)
(reprinted from Natl. L.J., Aug. 2, 1993) (discussing basic elements of a comprehensive sexual
harassment policy); Wallach & Creem, supra note 13, at 16.
Ill. Brigid Moynahan, Creating Harassment-Free Zones, TRAINING & DEV., May 1, 1993, at 67;
Carol Kleiman, Companies Dragging Feet on Training, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1998, at 1; Hellen
Hemphill & Ray Haines, Confronting Discrimination in Your Workplace, HR FOCUS, July 1, 1998, at
S5; Joanne Cole, Legal Sexual Harassment: New Rules, New Behavior, HR FoCus, Mar. 1, 1999, at 1;
Jennifer J. Laabs, Sexual Harassment, PERSONNEL J., Feb. 1, 1995, at 36.
112. See H.B. Karp & Nancy Sutton, Where Diversity Training Goes Wrong, TRAINING AND HUM.
RESOURCES DEV., July 1993, at 31.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Delikat, supra note 18, at 197-98; Lena Williams, Companies Capitalizing on Worker
Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at Al; Heather MacDonald, The Diversity Industry: Cashing in
on Affirmative Action, NEW REPUBLIC, July 5, 1993, at 22.
116. Williams, supra note 115, at Al.
117. Id.; Lubove, supra note 7, at 122.
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to prompt participants to confront their own biases," 8 and to recognize and
value cultural differences." 9 To accomplish these goals, some trainers
actively seek to "cause discomfort,"'
120 and to "ruffl[e] feathers."'' 21
1. Sexual Harassment Training in Context
Many of the first anti-discrimination training programs were designed
to educate management on the subject of sexual harassment. 122  Such
workshops were likely prompted in great part by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") 1980 Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex. 123  First, the Guidelines define sexual harassment as a
violation of Title VII. 124  A subsection then rather chillingly states that
employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment regardless of
whether the acts were forbidden by the employer and whether or not the
employer knew or should have known of their occurrence. 2  The
Guidelines also reference the issue of harassment prevention:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their
right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and
developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
126
There are a few important points to note about this provision in
particular and the Guidelines in general. First, while the section on
prevention does not specifically mention educational programs, training is
one obvious method by which a workforce can be sensitized and
information can be conveyed about sexual harassment. Thus, while
employers had to make an inferential leap to settle on training as a
preventative technique, that leap was a small one.
Second, as one early commentator correctly noted, the provision
118. MacDonald, supra note 115, at 22; Delikat, supra note 18, at 200.
119. Delikat, supra note 18, at 200.
120. Kathleen Murray, The Unfortunate Side Effects of 'Diversity Training,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1993, at C5.
121. Williams, supra note 115, at Al.
122. Sally Jacobs, Sexual Harassment, 7 NEW ENG. Bus. 25 (1985), available in 1985 WL
2254793, *5.
123. Id.
124. 29 CFR § 1604.1 l(a) (1980). Sexual harassment was judicially recognized as a form of sex
discrimination in 1976. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 54 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
125. 29 CFR § 1604.1 1(c). This provision of the Guidelines was rescinded after the decisions in
Ellerth and Faragher.
126. Id. § 1604.11(f).
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"do[es] not imply, much less guarantee, the adoption of affirmative steps
will immunize an employer from liability.""1 7 Yet the underlying logic of
the provision is apparent: the best way to avoid liability is to decrease the
incidence of harassment, which may perhaps be accomplished by taking the
affirmative steps recommended. Indeed, the commentator himself
recommended supervisory training in sexual harassment law as a necessary
component of a preventative program.1
2 8
Third, it was understood at the time of the issuance of the Guidelines
that they were not binding on the courts. 129  Rather, the rulings,
interpretations, and opinions issued by the EEOC were and continue to be
considered "a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 130 Thus, although it was
possible that the courts might ultimately disregard the Guidelines, the risk
that they might be judicially embraced certainly existed. One would
therefore expect that the ambiguity in the law would prompt many
employers to take action by promulgating sexual harassment policies and
developing training programs in the wake of the Guidelines' publication.' 3'
Sexual harassment training has in fact become a routine feature of the
American workplace, with annual revenue for the training industry
estimated to be in the billions.'32 Management attorneys and human
resource specialists regularly counsel employers to train employees in all
aspects of sexual harassment. 3 3  Training advocates typically make two
important claims about the effectiveness and need for sexual harassment
training. Trainers say that education can alter behavior by making
employees aware of actionable conduct.'34 Advocates also increasingly say
127. Fred W. Suggs, Jr., Advising Your Corporate Client on Avoiding Charges of Sexual
Harassment, 46 ALA. LAW. 176, 180 (1985).
128. Id. at 181.
129. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (noting that the EEOC does
not have authority under Title VII to promulgate binding, substantive regulations).
130. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
131. See Horace A. Thompson III, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment After Vinson: The
Regulation of 'Romance' in the Workplace, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 239,
249 (1989); Jacobs, supra note 122, at *5.
132. Silverstein, supra note 7, at Al.
133. Thompson, supra note 131, at 256 (noting that written policies are ineffective without
"training of supervisors regarding prohibited conduct"); Rebecca A. Thacker & Haidee Allerton,
Preventing Harassment in the Workplace, TRAINING & DEV., Feb. 1, 1992, at 50 ("Keep harassment
incidents at bay by training employees in how to respond to them."); Barry J. Baroni, Unwelcome
Advances: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, TRAINING & DEV., May 1, 1992, at 19, *2 (noting that
"education and training can be an effective prevention tool"); Howard G. Ziff & Donald G. Cherry,
Clear Policies Prevent Claims of Harassment, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at S1 ("Supervisors must be
trained about sexual harassment.").
134. E.g., Baroni, supra note 133, at 19 (stating that employees who are taught about actionable
conduct tend to avoid it); Thacker & Allerton, supra note 133, at 50 (arguing that sexual harassment
"training can be the first step toward eliminating the behavior"); Cole, supra note 111, at I (quoting
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that training, in conjunction with an anti-harassment policy and detailed
investigative procedure, can limit an employer's liability for sexual
harassment.135
Litigation prevention remains the primary objective of sexual
harassment training. 136 Important legal cases, like the1986 Vinson decision,
thus appear to fuel the training trend. 137  Indeed, demand for training has
reportedly increased since the Ellerth and Faragher decisions."'
Moreover the claim that training can limit employer liability for
harassment has become quite specific since Ellerth and Faragher. For
example, a little less than a year before the Kolstad decision created a
punitive damage safe harbor for employers who take steps to educate their
employees, attorney Margaret McCausland stated that sexual harassment
training would likely keep a "jury [from] awarding punitive damages."' 13 9
Additionally, some training advocates represent Ellerth and Faragher as
expressly mandating sexual harassment training, even though the decisions
say absolutely nothing of the kind. Susan Meiseinger, of the Society for
Human Resource Management, put it this way: "The [C]ourt said ... [i]f
you don't provide some kind of sexual harassment training to your
employees, you're going to be liable."14 Christine Amalfe, an attorney
who regularly conducts sexual harassment training, noted that "[t]he
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that employers.., need to send a
consultant Darlene Orlov, who says that her work involves "changing behavior"); Mindy Friedler,
Sexual Harassment: Prevention is Best Cure, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 11, 1994, at 5 (implying that training can
help employees become aware that some behavior is objectionable).
135. E.g., Laabs, supra note 11, at 36 ("When you combine a strong policy, regular training and a
detailed and timely investigation procedure into your sexual harassment strategy, experts agree that you
may have a fighting chance in limiting your liability ...."); Eric Wallach & Stacey B. Creem, Handling
Sexual Harassment Charges in the Workplace, N.Y.L.J., July 16, 1996, at I (describing a
"comprehensive education program" as the first step employers can take "to insulate themselves from
liability"); Mathiason & de Bernardo, supra note 13, at 31 ("[lIt is now very clear that employers face
significant liability if they fail to thoroughly train employees in all aspects of sexual harassment .... ).
136. See Joann Keyton & Steven C. Rhodes, Organizational Sexual Harassment: Translating
Research into Application, 27 J. OF App. COMMUN. RES. 158, 161 (1999).
137. See D.J. Petersen & D.P. Massengill, Sexual Harassment Cases Five Years After Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 18 EMP. RELS. L.J. 489, 514 (1992-1993) (concluding harassment training is an
important measure in preventing costly litigation).
138. Peter Aronson, Justices' Sex Harassment Decisions Spark Fears, NATL. L.J., Nov. 9, 1998, at
Al (noting that since the decisions "employment law specialists are reporting a dramatic increase in
inquiries and requests for training..."); Ganzel, supra note 54, at 86 (describing the recent attention
generated by Ellerth and Faragher as a "bonanza for independent trainers and employment lawyers
alike"); Robert Mullins, Law Firms Sell Acumen in Harassment Policy, Bus. J.-MILWAUKEE, Aug. 7,
1998, at 21; Kathy Robertson, Sex Talk Keeps Ex-FBIAgents Busy, Bus. J.-SACRAMENTO, Feb. 5, 1999,
at 3; but cf. Kleiman, supra note 11, at 1 (claiming that the increase in demand for sexual harassment
training has been small).
139. Aronson, supra note 138, at Al (quoting Margaret McCausland).
140. Ganzel, supra note 54, at *6 (quoting Susan Meisinger).
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message to employees" and that trainers are the "messengers."' 41 Perhaps
the increased opportunity to sell their services, generated by employer
concern about the harassment decisions, prompted such comments.
Interestingly, the EEOC recently issued a policy document interpreting
the Ellerth and Faragher decisions that specifically references sexual
harassment training.'42 Published in 1999, the guidance suggests that
employers provide all employees with training "to ensure that they
understand their rights and responsibilities."'43  The EEOC further
recommends periodic supervisory training to "explain the types of conduct
that violate the employer's anti-harassment policy; the seriousness of the
policy; the responsibilities of supervisors and managers when they learn of
the alleged harassment; and the prohibition against retaliation.""' These
suggestions will no doubt provide further impetus for the training trend.
The evolution of sexual harassment training described above seems a
classic example of Edelman's theory, of legal endogeneity 45 Sexual
harassment training was initially undertaken by employers as an attempt to
evidence fair treatment in the face of ambiguities about the law.
46
Subsequently, the judiciary recognized this extensive corporate practice
through its articulation of a new jurisprudence of education and
prevention. 47  Edelman's theory then posits that the "professions,
sometimes with greater enthusiasm than is perhaps warranted, filter and
disseminate court decisions" in a way that reinforces and legitimates the
initial organizational response to the law. 148  The comments of training
advocates in the wake of Ellerth and Faragher are filtering those decisions
for the trainers' constituents-employers subject to anti-discrimination
law-thereby bolstering the practice of conducting sexual harassment
training.
2. Diversity Training in Context
Popular commentators trace the roots of modern diversity training to a
1987 Hudson Institute study entitled "Workforce 2000." 149  The study,
141. Id. at *3-4 (quoting Christine Amalfe).
142. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors (6/18(99), EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA), N:4075 [Binder 3].
143. Id. at § V(C)(1).
144. Id. at § V(C)(2).
145. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
146, See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
148. Edelman et al., supra note 20, at 447.
149. Joel Makower, Managing Diversity in the Workplace, BUS. & SOC'Y REV., Winter 1995, at 48
(noting that the Hudson Institute study "stunned corporate America"); Murray, supra note 120, at C5
(noting that some diversity programs "were inspired" by the Hudson Institute report).
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which projected that the U.S. workforce would increase by over twenty-five
million workers by the year 2005, predicted that eighty-five percent of the
new workers would be minorities, women, and immigrants. 50 This report,
according to conventional wisdom, galvanized corporate America,
prompting recognition that training was necessary to integrate the new
workers into the existing workforce. 5' Enterprising consultants rose to the
challenge, offering programs that promised increased productivity,
employee flexibility, and innovation. 112
While it is highly improbable that one report created a revolution,
employers over the last decade have propelled diversity training into a
multi-billion dollar business.' By one estimate, forty percent of all U.S.
companies engage in some form of diversity training.'54 Another estimate
pegs diversity training saturation at fifty percent of all American companies
employing over one-hundred employees.
5
Situating diversity training within the larger organizational response to
civil rights law can help one understand the form and function of those
programs. As noted above, Title VII was the impetus for employers'
development of a host of organizational programs and policies intended to
signal compliance with EEO law."5 6 Until recently, little was known about
whether those practices produced substantive gains for women and
minorities or, in the alternative, functioned as "merely ceremonial
gestures."' 57 The issue is an important one, for if legal compliance can be
effectuated symbolically rather than substantively, the transformative
potential of civil rights law is greatly reduced.
A recent study by Lauren Edelman and Stephen Petterson assessed the
substantive impact of four types of EEO structures: EEO offices, 58
affirmative action plans, 159 affirmative action recruitment programs, 60 and
affirmative action training programs.'16  Edelman and Petterson found that
150. Williams, supra note 115, at Al.
151. See L.A. Kauffman, The Diversity Game, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 31, 1993, at 29, 30.
152. Michael Mobley & Tamara Payne, Backlash! The Challenge to Diversity Training, TRAINING
& DEV., Dec. 1, 1992, at 45.
153. See Lubove, supra note 7, at 122.
154. MacDonald, supra note 115, at 22.
155. Lubove, supra note 7, at 122.
156. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
157. Edelman & Petterson, supra note 84, at 107.
158. These small departments are generally created to address legal concerns and a range of
personnel functions. Id. at 117.
159. Affirmative action plans are written documents that analyze the representation of women and
minorities throughout an organization and typically establish goals and timetables to improve
deficiencies in representation. Id.
160. These programs seek to recruit women and minorities for positions in which those groups are
not well represented. Id.
161. Training programs are designed to train women and minorities for jobs in which the groups
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programs characterized by general rather than specific purposes were likely
to fail to produce substantive results. 162 The output of these generalized
structures was difficult to evaluate, and therefore they were easily
"decoupled from day-to-day organizational activities. 163  Of the four
systems studied, only one-affirmative action recruitment programs-had a
statistically significant positive effect on the workforce representation of
women and minorities. 64 Notably, the study concluded that affirmative
action plans do not improve the status of underrepresented groups unless
they are tied to recruitment programs. 165  Even more disturbing is the
additional finding that affirmative action plans "actually harm the
employment status of women."'
166
Edelman and Petterson's results regarding affirmative action programs
are important because academics believe that diversity initiatives arose as a
response to the limitations of affirmative action. 167  Organizations found
that affirmative action programs had a divisive effect on the workforce.
White males generally perceived such efforts with anxiety and
resentment. 161 Minorities were impatient with the rate of organizational
integration and the resistance of some whites to the initiatives. 169  In
response, employers sought to mend the racial divide by hiring consultants
to conduct sensitivity training. 7 ° The earliest such efforts appeared in the
mid 1970s.
171
Employers undertake diversity training for a number of reasons. Three
motivating factors are typically acknowledged: the moral imperative,
business profitability, and legal pressures. 172  From a moral perspective,
organizations conduct diversity training because they sense that increasing
are not well represented. Id.
162. Id. at 113-14.
163. Id. at 114.
164. Id. at 126-29.
165. Id. at 129.
166. Id.
167. See Linda S. Gottfredson, Dilemmas in Developing Diversity Programs, in DIVERSITY IN THE
WORKPLACE: HUMAN RESOURCE INITIATIVES 279, 280 (Susan E. Jackson, ed., 1992); Colin Cooper &
Chalmer E. Thompson, Managing Corporate Racial Diversity, in RACIAL IDENTITY THEORY:
APPLICATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTERVENTIONS 181 (Chalmer E.
Thompson & Robert T. Carter, eds., 1997).




172. Bernardo M. Ferdman & Sari Einy Brody, Models of Diversity Training, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERCULTURAL TRAINING 282, 284-90 (2d ed., Dan Landis & Rabi S. Bhagat, eds., 1996); see also
Rose Mary Wentling & Nilda Palma-Rivas, Current Status and Future Trends of Diversity Initiatives in
the Workplace: Diversity Experts Perspective, 9 HUM. RESOURCES DEV. Q. 235 (1998) (listing four
major reasons for diversity programs as: improving productivity and competitiveness, forming better
employee relationships, enhancing social responsibility, and addressing legal concerns).
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the workforce participation of under-represented groups is the right thing to
do.'73 Diversity programs also seek to boost corporate profits by creating
organizational inter-group harmony. 74 In other words, the training purports
to improve employee retention, skills, and performance, which in turn
influence an organization's bottom line.
75
For purposes of this Article, however, the most interesting motivator is
that of legal pressures. The existence of civil rights law prompts many
employers to conduct diversity training as a form of litigation prevention.'76
One study, which involved interviews of human resource specialists, found
that EEO "guidelines and the potential for litigation" were the most
frequently cited reasons for undertaking diversity training.'77 Recently,
management attorneys have begun recommending the implementation of
diversity and sensitivity training as a strategy for avoiding discrimination
suits. 178  Employers, perhaps frightened by several recent and well-
publicized discrimination class actions, 79 may be paying heed to that
advice.
The objectives of diversity training are quite broad and general. Goals
include: providing information about EEO laws and societal demographic
changes, increasing participant awareness of cultural and other differences,
developing skills to enable employees to work well together, and changing
the culture of the organization." 0 Sometimes the training itself is treated as
an organizational objective.' 8' The very generality of the goals makes
measuring training outcomes problematic. In fact, program evaluations are
rarely conducted." 2 Recalling Edelman and Petterson's conclusion that
173. Ferdman & Brody, supra note 172, at 285; see also Sheryl Lindsley, Organizational
Interventions to Prejudice, in COMMUNICATING PREJUDICE 302, 303 (Michael L. Hecht, ed., 1998)
(noting that organizations engage in diversity training to address "humanitarian concerns").
174. Lindsley, supra note 173, at 303; Kauffman, supra note 151, at 31; Williams, supra note 115,
at Al.
175. Ferdman & Brody, supra note 172, at 288-89.
176. Id. at 287; see also Lindsley, supra note 173, at 303 (noting that one motivation for
implementing training is the need to comply with EEO guidelines); Wentling & Palma-Rivas, supra
note 172, at 243 ("Legal concerns were another frequently mentioned motive for managing diversity,
with the experts citing reduction or prevention of discrimination lawsuits ... ").
177. Katrina Jordan, Diversity Training in the Workplace Today: A Status Report, 58 J. OF CAREER
PLANNING & EMP. 46, 51 (1998).
178. Weirich, supra note 13, at 41; Siniscalco & Wohl, supra note 13, at 27.
179. See Weirich, supra note 13, at 34-38 (describing suits brought against Texaco, Shoney's Inc.,
Publix Super Markets, Mitsubishi, and Home Depot).
180. Ferdman & Brody, supra note 172, at 292-94; see also Deborah L. Plummer, Approaching
Diversity Training in the Year 2000, 50 CONSULTING PSYCH. J. 181, 182-83 (1998) (stating training
goals as: heightening awareness of cultural identity, helping participants understand the sociopolitical
implications of diversity, opening up dialogue, teaching cultural competence skills, and examining the
organization's cultural norms).
181. Lindsley, supra note 173, at 308.
182. Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, A Field Survey of Factors Affecting the Adoption and Perceived
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generalized EEO structures are likely to produce merely symbolic rather
than substantive results, it may well be that diversity training is mere
window dressing.'83
Window dressing aside, the process of legal endogeneity regarding
these programs is quite apparent following the Supreme Court's decision in
Kolstad. That case, as noted above, legitimated the long-standing employer
practice of anti-discrimination training by creating a safe harbor from
punitive damages for employers who make good faith efforts to educate
employees about Title VII's prohibitions.'84 In the short time since the case
was decided, management attorneys have rushed to interpret and
disseminate its message of employee education to their clients.'85
Stating that the Court "explicitly recognized 'training' as another form
of reducing potential liability in discrimination and harassment lawsuits,"
one pair of advocates recently stressed that "employees must be sensitized
to diversity issues and trained to avoid, and recognize, conduct which may
be perceived as inappropriate .. ."186 Another pair of advocates stated that
"clear cut policies, procedures, and training programs ... is the strongest
possible evidence of good faith efforts to prevent discrimination, which is
key to disavowing liability for supervisory and other misconduct."' 87
Thinking ahead to future defense arguments, another attorney noted that
anti-discrimination policies and training may ultimately be used to avoid
the imposition of liability in all Title VII actions.18  Such comments make
clear the legal profession's acceptance of training as an antidote for
workplace discrimination. Two other ways in which that support manifests
Success of Diversity Training, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 247, 253 (1995); Pushkala Prasad & Albert J.
Mills, From Showcase to Shadow, in MANAGING THE ORGANIZATIONAL MELTING POT: DILEMMAS OF
WORKPLACE DIVERSITY 3, 13 (Pushkala Prasad et al., eds., 1997).
183. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
185. E.g., Stephen T. Lindo & Rose M. Corbett, Faragher and Ellerth Tale Hold: EEOC and U.S.
Supreme Court Reinforce the Benefits to Employers of Good Faith Efforts to Maintain Discrimination-
Free Workplaces, METRO. CORP. COuNS., Oct. 1999, at II ("[Anlemployer[] should make every effort
to properly train and educate its workforce about its anti-discrimination policies."); John A. Beranbaum,
Kolstad v. American Dental Association: Punitive Damages Under Title VII, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 18, 1999, at
I (noting that good faith compliance efforts need to include "equal employment opportunity training of
staff"); Peter N. Hillman, Employers Can Limit Discrimination Liability, as Recent Decisions Applying
Supreme Court Rulings Make Clear, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2000, at 19 (noting that "all hands
training sessions... are part of good preventive medicine."); Susan K. Krell, Monitoring E-Mail and
Internet Use, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1999, at 15 ("Protection against [discrimination] litigation is
available through supervisory training ... ").
186. Edward A. Brill & Frank F. Martinez, Avoid Employment Liability Risks: Five Crucial
Preventative Measures for Start-Up Companies, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 2000, at S4.
187. Laura H. Allen & Jodi E. Divak, Protecting Yourself. What Employers Should Do To Avoid
Punitive Damages Award in Title VII Actions, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov. 1999, at 24.
188. Margo L. Ely, Ruling on Punitive Damages May Go Beyond Bias Cases, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., July 12, 1999, at 6.
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itself will be discussed below.
B. Anti-Discrimination Training and the Legal Profession
The legal profession, by and large, has turned to anti-discrimination
training as a quick and easy method for correcting discriminatory work
environments. To gauge the profession's implicit endorsement of
instruction as a weapon against workplace inequality, this section reviews
references to training programs in discrimination suit settlements and
judicial decisions.
1. Training in Settlements and Consent Decrees
Recent well-publicized discrimination lawsuit settlements and consent
decrees reveal the legal profession's support for anti-discrimination
training. In a number of these cases, the employer defendants agreed not
only to provide compensation for aggrieved plaintiffs, but also to allocate
significant sums for diversity and sexual harassment training. Although
plaintiff's attorneys and EEOC lawyers are no doubt the parties most
strenuously advocating training components in settlement agreements,' 89
employers consent to these agreements with the advice of defense counsel.
Examples of these settlements are worth consideration. For instance,
in 1995, the EEOC brought suit against Sears on behalf of eight former
employees, claiming that these workers had been sexually harassed,
constructively discharged, and retaliated against.1 9° Under a court approved
settlement agreement, Sears promised to provide its employees with two
years of sexual harassment training. 1 ' Additionally, in June of 1998,
Mitsubishi settled a sexual harassment class action brought by the EEOC
for $34 million. 92 That settlement included a plan to provide sexual
harassment training for 4,000 employees at Mitsubishi's Normal, Illinois
plant. 93 Finally, Ford Motor Company settled a sexual harassment suit
with the EEOC in 1999. The settlement agreement in that case allocated
$10 million for sexual harassment training.
1 94
In addition to sexual harassment training, diversity training also crops
up in settlement agreements. For example, such training was a component
189. See Lubove, supra note 7, 122 (quoting plaintiffs attorneys James Finberg and Cyrus Mehri
and discussing the increasing frequency with which the EEOC proposes training as part of settlement).
190. Mathiason & de Bernardo, supra note 13, at 27.
191. Id.
192. Joann Muller, Ford: The High Cost of Harassment, BUS. WK, Nov. 15, 1999, at 94.
193. Plan to Distribute Mitsubishi Settlement is Approved by Judge, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1999,
available in 1999 WL-WSJ 5458102.
194. Muller, supra note 192, at 94.
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of a recent settlement agreement between female dock workers in Tacoma,
Washington and the shipping companies and labor unions that the women
sued for discrimination and harassment.'95 Diversity training emphasizing
religious tolerance was part of a settlement between Wal-Mart and its
former sales associate, who alleged that the company engaged in religious
discrimination. 96  Not long ago, lawyers for Boeing and three race
discrimination plaintiffs filed a proposed consent decree providing, inter
alia, that the company will implement extensive equal opportunity and
diversity training programs. 197 As part of a settlement between Campbell
University and a physical education instructor stricken with AIDS, the
University agreed to provide AIDS awareness and sensitivity training to its
employees. 198
Texaco's landmark settlement with a class of employees suing the
company for race discrimination is perhaps the most widely recognized of
the recent cases involving Title VII claims. Plaintiffs in that suit contended
that Texaco engaged in an entrenched pattern and practice of wage and
promotion discrimination that favored whites over minority employees.' 99
The case is notorious for the publicity surrounding the release of a tape
recording of executives allegedly discussing document destruction20 and
using racial epithets.201 In particular, several Texaco executives referred to
African-American employees as "black jelly beans," a metaphor they
ironically picked up in a diversity training lecture at an oil industry
conference.202
The company ultimately settled the suit for a whopping $176 million
2 3
in addition to agreeing to a variety of unprecedented terms. 204  A $35
million, court monitored, independent "Equality and Tolerance Task Force"
was created to revamp the company's human resource policies and
195. Mathiason & Bernardo, supra note 13, at 27.
196. See id.; Hamby v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 93-3444-CV-S (W.D. Mo. July 28, 1995); see
also Mathiason & Bernardo, supra note 13, at 27.
197. Nan Netherton, Boeing Agrees to Settle Race Discrimination Suits, DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 26,
1999, at A15.
198. See Instructor with AIDS Nets Return to Job and $325,000 in Bias Suit Settlement, EMPL. LIT.
REP., June 13, 1995, at 18632; see also Mathiason & Bemardo, supra note 13, at 27.
199. Weirich, supra note 13, at 34.
200. A federal jury acquitted two former Texaco executives of conspiracy and obstruction ofjustice
charges in the matter. John Herzfeld, Race Discrimination: Jury Acquits Former Texaco Executives in
Criminal Obstruction of Justice Case, DAILY LAB. REP., May 14, 1998, at A9.
201. Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, on Tape, Discussed Impending Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1996, at Al.
202. Hanna Rosin, Cultural Revolution at Texaco, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 2, 1998, at 15.
203. Nadya Aswad & John Herzfeld, Texaco Corp. Agrees to Spend $176 Million to Settle Race
Bias Suit, DAILY LAB. REP., Nov. 18, 1996, at AAI.
204. Rosin, supra note 202, at 16.
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practices. 2 5  Texaco also agreed to transform its corporate culture by
redesigning and expanding its sensitivity awareness and diversity training
programs.2 °6
Texaco's revamped diversity program consists of a two-day seminar.
20 7
On the first day, Awareness Day, employees are encouraged to uncover the
negative assumptions they have of others and how their own behavior
influences those around them.20 8  Games and exercises help each trainee
with the process of self-evaluation. The day ends with trainees writing a
personal action plan to facilitate their behavioral change.20 9  Day two
focuses on diversity issues. Among other activities, employees are shown a
video cartoon entitled "A Peacock in the Land of Penguins." Although the
video is designed to promote cultural understanding, one commentator
described it as filled with stereotypical assumptions about women and
minorities. 2'0 All of Texaco's 20,000 employees are required to complete
the training program2
2. Training in Judicial Decisions
References to sexual harassment and diversity training are not limited
to discrimination lawsuit settlements. Training is also mentioned in judicial
decisions, most often opinions considering employer motions for summary
judgment. The decisions usually cite training as a fact favorable to the
employer and almost never consider the content of the training program.1 2
Indeed, it is rare to find a judge who has anything negative to say about
educational efforts.213
In sexual harassment suits, training is frequently cited as evidence that
an employer acted reasonably to prevent harassment and thus satisfies the
first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.214 Moreover, sexual
205. Cyrus Mehri, Agreeing to Cultural Change, LEGAL TIMES, May 12, 1997, at S30.
206. Mathiason & de Bernardo, supra note 13, at 28; Weirich, supra note 13, at 34.





212. A notable exception is Cadena v. The Pacesetter Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (1998). In
that case the court refused to take "at face value" employer evidence of due care, including the provision
of sexual harassment training. Id.
213. One judge did, however, speculate about the potential for backlash prompted by diversity
training programs. Blanken v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 944 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (S.D. Ohio,
1996).
214. Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that in "addition to
distributing a [sexual harassment] policy to its employees, [the employer] regularly conducted training
sessions on sexual harassment"); Hetreed v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1999 WL 311728, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (noting with approval that the employer had a detailed sexual harassment policy and provided
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harassment training undertaken subsequent to an investigation of an
employee complaint is typically viewed as a prompt remedial response
enabling an employer to avoid liability.215 Similarly, one recent racial
harassment and discrimination decision held that the implementation of
mandatory diversity training was evidence of the employer's efforts to
prevent future harassment, supporting the employer's motion for summary
judgment.216
Judicial acceptance of anti-discrimination training is also evident in
cases where the failure to conduct harassment or diversity training is cited
to support denials of employer motions for summary judgment in
discrimination suits. 2 17  Although these cases do not represent favorable
outcomes for employers, they do indicate the evidentiary value of providing
sexual harassment and diversity training.
Training is likewise portrayed as a valuable undertaking in decisions
considering whether a prayer for punitive damages is appropriate. Courts in
two recent cases granted employer motions for summary judgment on the
managers with training); DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280, 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting
that the defendant had "an anti-sexual harassment training program" and then concluding that the policy
was effective); EEOC v. Barton Protective Services, 47 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that
the employer provided "EEO training"); Maddin v. GTE of Florida, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 1027, 1032
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing favorably the fact that the employer "provided training about sexual harassment
for its employees and supervisors"); Fiscus v. Triumph Group Operations, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1240
(D. Kan. 1998) (stating that the company "conducted anti-harassment workshops/training for its
supervisors"); Landrau Romero v. Caribbean Restaurants, 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191-92 (D.P.R. 1998)
(noting that the plaintiff received training in sexual harassment).
215. E.g., Mirakhorli v. DFW Management. Co., 1999 WL 354226, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (citing
as favorable evidence fact that company renewed harassment training after investigating plaintiffs
complaint); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Technologies, 1999 WL 226208, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that
after investigating plaintiff's complaint, "the company conducted mandatory sexual harassment training
for all employees"); Garcia v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 351, 358 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(noting that employer had sexual harassment perpetrator watch a sensitivity training video).
216. Walker v. Thompson, No. 97-CV-2437-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219, at *30 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (granting the employer's motion for summary judgment) rev'd on other grounds, 214 F.3d 615;
see also Bolden v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority, No. 96-CIV-2835 (AGS), 1997 WL 666236, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1997) (noting that once plaintiff made employer aware of perpetrator's use of racial
epithets, it sent him for diversity training and counseling).
217. E.g., Mortenson v. City of Oldsmar, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that
main perpetrators did not attend sexual harassment training); Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011,
1020 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (noting that the court has neither seen the employer's sexual harassment policy
nor been provided with details on its training program); Miller v. D.F. Zee's, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 792,
803, 808 (D. Or. 1998) (noting that neither diversity nor sexual harassment training was conducted);
Snapp-Foust v. National Construction, L.L.C., 1 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778-79 n. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)
("Defendant has produced no evidence of any further dissemination of the [sexual harassment] policy or
of any training of personnel regarding complaint procedures."); but cf. Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp.,
20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1386 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (granting employer motion for summary judgment where
harassment grievance procedure found legally sufficient despite a lack of training); Paton v. Dallas
County Community College Dist., 1996 WL 722056, at *8 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (noting that "lack of
seminars and 'sensitivity training' does not outweigh the fact" that the employer responded effectively
to a harassment complaint).
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issue of punitive damages, holding that sexual harassment training was
evidence of employer good faith.218 The Tenth Circuit recently held that an
employer's failure to provide a manager with "training in employment
discrimination" demonstrated a failure "to educate its employees" and "to
prevent discrimination in the workplace," making an award of punitive
damages appropriate.
219
The review above indicates that the legal profession's support for anti-
discrimination training is widespread. Most members of the profession,
however, appear to lack a sophisticated appreciation of the potential pitfalls
of training. For example, few attorneys write or speak about the fact that
training may reinforce stereotypes and produce attitude polarization.
20
Similarly, few judges acknowledge that poorly conducted training can do
more harm than good.22' Yet this type of discussion has been taking place
in the business community in the last few years.222 Additionally, social
scientists are beginning to turn their attention to anti-discrimination training
in an attempt to discern its possible effects on workplace dynamics. These
topics are taken up in the next section.
IV.
THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION TRAINING
Given the legal profession's embrace of anti-discrimination training
and the ubiquity of such educational efforts, one might assume that their
utility is beyond dispute. Yet very little empirical research has been done on
the effects of these programs. Although the lack of hard evidence has
generally failed to capture the attention of attorneys and judges, ignorance
about these matters is disturbing to social scientists.
Calling the gap in the sexual harassment literature "alarming," John
Pryor and Kathleen McKinney note that "we really are not sure about what,
218. Hull v. APCOAIStandard Parking Corp., 2000 WL 198881, at *15 (N.D. Ill. 2000);
Woodward v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 2000 WL 680415, at *16 (S.D. Ind. 2000); but
cf. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2000) (punitive damages
appropriate notwithstanding anti-discrimination training due to evidence of top executives' racial
animosity).
219. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 1999).
220. Management attorneys Jonathan Segal and Stephen Paskoff are exceptional in this regard.
Jonathan A. Segal, Sexual Harassment Prevention: Cement for the Glass Ceiling? HR MAGAZINE, Nov.
1, 1998, at 129 (discussing at length the potential adverse effects of sexual harassment training); Stephen
M. Paskoff, Ending the Workplace Diversity Wars, TRAINING, Aug. 1, 1996, at 42 (discussing the
negative effects of traditional diversity training); see also Delikat, supra note 18, at 203-06 (discussing
the potential backlash effects of diversity training).
221. But see Hartman v. Pena, 914 F. Supp. 225, 228-30 (N.D. Ill. 1995)(refusing to grant
employer's motion for summary judgment in case where air traffic controller argued that FAA sexual
harassment training constituted hostile environment harassment).
222. E.g., Lubove, supra note 7, at 122.
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if anything, works to educate people about sexual harassment [and to]
reduce incidents of harassment."2 3 Robert Moyer and Anjan Nath recently
described the problem this way: ".... [T]he unpleasant truth is that almost
nothing is known about the effects of sexual harassment education and
training programs." 224 Catherine Ellis and Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld voice
similar sentiments about diversity training noting that ".... information on
whether [diversity] programs are effective in meeting their goals is
sparse." 22
Some might view the scarcity of program outcome research as benign.
Elizabeth O'Hare Grundmann and her colleagues, however, point out that
the dearth of information is potentially dangerous for two reasons. 226 First,
preventative programs, even when adopted with the best of intentions, can
have negative effects.227 For example, a seminar that indicates that sexual
harassment is an underreported phenomenon may give some employees the
message that "the likelihood is good that they can get away with harassing"
others. 28 Second, providing training "gives the impression that 'something
is being done,"' lulling managers and others into a false sense of security.229
Yet an ineffective program may not affect the bottom line in the least; that
is it may not "reduce the incidence of sexual harassment" in the
organization.23 °
In line with these problems, Grundmann and her colleagues find
particularly worrisome the motivation behind the adoption of many anti-
discrimination training programs: litigation prevention.231  This
understandable impetus for training can eclipse what should be the purpose
of such programs-to have "a significant impact on an important social
problem. '232 To accomplish that aim through training, an institution must
223. John B. Pryor & Kathleen McKinney, Research on Sexual Harassment: Lingering Issues and
Future Directions, 17 BAsIC & APP. SOC. PSYCH. 605, 609 (1995).
224. Robert S. Moyer & Anjan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on Perceptions
of Sexual Harassment, 28 J. OF APP. SOC. PSYCH. 333, 334 (1998); see also Barbara A. Gutek, Sexual
Harassment Policy Initiatives, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 195,
196 (William O'Donahue ed. 1997)(describing current research on harassment training as scant yet
promising).
225. Ellis & Sormenfeld, supra note 17, at 84.
226. Elizabeth O'Hare Grundmann et al., The Prevention of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL





231. Id. at 176; see also Keyton & Rhodes, supra note 136, 161 (1999) ("Unfortunately, the
primary objective of many [sexual harassment] training programs is to reduce the organization's legal
and fiduciary responsibility.").
232. Grundmann, supra note 226, at 176; see also Gutek, supra note 224, at 196 (warning that "[i]n
their eagerness to show that they are doing something" employers may be selecting trainers who lack
knowledge about harassment).
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strive to implement a "demonstrably effective program" that is
"systematically evaluated. ' 233  Unfortunately, employers typically do not
evaluate their anti-discrimination training programs.
234
The sections below review what little is known about sexual
harassment and diversity training. Since scientific studies are sparse,
anecdotal information about the programs is also presented. Data on
attitude polarization, a possible negative effect of anti-discrimination
training, is discussed thereafter.
A. The Possible Effects of Sexual Harassment Training
Employers offering sexual harassment training likely do so with
several ends in mind: increasing knowledge about harassment, eliminating
inappropriate behavior, and changing the attitudes of those who may be
predisposed to harass others.235 In the last several years, a few studies have
addressed the ability of training to accomplish those aims. Most of the
studies focus on the first goal, knowledge acquisition and its effects.
Although each study asks the question somewhat differently, the thrust of
the investigations is whether training increases a subject's tendency to
perceive harassment when presented with hypothetical situations.
All of the studies found, at least in part, that training increases the
sensitivity of trainees to possible instances of sexual harassment.236 Robert
Moyer and Anjan Nath's work, however, makes an important distinction
between increasing the tendency to perceive harassment and boosting
expertise in identifying harassment.2 37 One of their experiments determined
that although video-trained subjects were better than untrained subjects at
detecting hypothetical instances of harassment, this gain was offset by a
comparable increase in false positives; that is, the trainees were also
significantly more likely to perceive hypothetical harassment when it had
233. See Grundmann, supra note 226, at 176.
234. Id.
235. Elissa L. Perry et al., Individual Differences in the Effectiveness of Sexual Harassment
Awareness Training, 28 J. OF App. SOC. PSYCH. 698, 699 (1998) (discussing study of whether training
affects these goals).
236. Blakely et al., The Effects of Training on Perceptions of Sexual Harassment Allegations, 28 J.
OF App. SOC. PSYCH. 71, 78-79 (1998) (noting that [i]ndividuals who saw a training video rated severe
hypothetical harassment as "significantly more harassing than did those who had not seen the video");
Moyer & Nath, supra note 224, at 344 (noting that "trained participants perceived sexual harassment
more often than did untrained participants"); Perry, supra note 235, at 715-16 (finding that a sexual
harassment training video more greatly affected the knowledge of subjects with a high propensity to
harass than those with a low propensity to harass); York et al., Preventing Sexual Harassment: The
Effect of Multiple Training Methods, 10 EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBiLrriEs & RTS. J. 277, 285 (1997)
(presenting case problems before showing training videos "sensitizes subjects to the occurrence of
sexual harassment behavior.. .in the videos").
237. Moyer & Nath, supra note 224, at 336.
2001]
32 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 22:1
not occurred.238
A second experiment performed by the pair found that training via
written materials in a packet-an informational poster and harassment
policy statement-boosted the expertise of men in identifying harassment
while failing to affect the expertise of women.239 The study authors
interpreted this result as leveling the perceptual expertise of men and
women, since untrained women performed more expertly than untrained
men did.24° While the second experiment holds out the hope that sexual
harassment training can positively affect the ability of at least male trainees
to correctly discern impermissible behavior, Moyer and Nath confess that
they are not sure which of several differences between the studies accounts
for their differing results.241 Thus, they recommend that more work be done
to evaluate the effectiveness of specific kinds of training programs.242
Obviously, some training efforts will promote real, lasting gains while
others will not.
The work of Kenneth York and his colleagues takes up the challenge
of evaluating different sexual harassment training methods.243 Their study
assessed the utility of a combination of two different training modes. A
harassment training video provided subjects with examples of behavior to
be avoided.2" Case studies for participant consideration offered subjects
the chance to practice the concepts being taught.245 The question posed was
whether some mixture of the two training modes would make subjects
"more sensitive to behaviors that might be interpreted as sexual
harassment." 2"
One group of subjects in the York study viewed a sexual harassment
training video. Participants were then asked to determine whether each of
five short episodes in the video constituted sexual harassment.247 Before
watching the training video, a second group of subjects was asked to read
one of two case studies and then to answer in writing a number of questions
about both the case and sexual harassment in general.248 The study authors
found that subjects who had read either case study before watching the
238. Id. at 340-41. A false positive was defined as identifying harassment in any of seven
hypothetical scenarios that an expert panel had defined as failing to constitute harassment. Id. at 340.
239. Id. at 343.
240. Id. at 348.
241. Id. at 344.
242. Id. at 348. Blakely and his colleagues also note the need for empirical investigation of specific
kinds of training programs. Blakely, supra note 236, at 80.
243. York, supra note 236, at 277.
244. Id. at 278-79.
245. Id. at 279.
246. Id. at 279.
247. Id. at 280.
248. Id. at 281.
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video were more likely to view the video episodes as instances of sexual
harassment than were their counterparts who had only seen the video.24 9
Unlike the Moyer and Nath study, York and his colleagues did not
assess whether greater subject sensitivity represented an increase in subject
expertise. Nonetheless, their work points out that combined training
methods, which permit subjects to actively apply the concepts that they
learn passively, may represent the best way to conduct educational
programs. Indeed, the authors recommend a program that provides general
information about the law, allows participants to watch a video and analyze
case problems, and then requires discussion of the materials and sexual
harassment in the participants' organization.25 °
As noted above, employers who conduct training may wish to do more
than simply increase their employees' knowledge about sexual harassment.
They might also hope to reduce objectionable behavior and alter the
attitudes of employees with a propensity to engage in harassment. 25' A
study conducted by Elissa Perry and her colleagues sought to gauge the
impact of a harassment training video on all three indices: knowledge,
behavior, and attitudes. 252 The study also examined whether video training
similarly affects individuals with differing propensities to harass others.
25 3
The subjects for the Perry study, all males, were first asked to complete
a survey that measured each individual's likelihood to sexually harass
("LSH").2 4 Participants with differing LSH scores were then asked to
watch either a harassment or a sign language training video. 255 Following
the initial video viewing, all participants watched a golf video and were
subsequently asked to teach a female confederate how to putt.256 The
putting session was unobtrusively videotaped and later watched and rated
by two female coders.257
After the putting session, the male subjects were asked to complete a
post-study questionnaire to gauge their knowledge about sexual
harassment.25 8 They were also asked to complete a survey that once again
measured each individual's LSH in order to determine whether video
harassment training impacted the attitudes of the participants.259
249. Id. at 283.
250. Id. at 286.
251. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
252. Perry, supra note 235, at 699.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 706. Study subjects did not, while actively participating in the study, know the actual
purpose of the survey or the experiment as a whole.
255. Id. at 707.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 708-09.
258. ld. at 708.
259. Id. at 709.
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Interestingly, the study determined that the harassment training video
did not increase the knowledge level of the participants overall. 260 Nor did
the harassment video make them less likely to engage in sexually
inappropriate behavior or to change their long term attitudes about
harassment.26'
Significantly, however, when the study authors tested for the effects of
the video training on subjects scoring high in the "propensity to harass"
category, they found different results. The sexual harassment video had a
greater impact on high LSH subjects' knowledge than their low LSH
counterparts. While untrained high LSH subjects were less accurate in their
sexual harassment knowledge than untrained low LSH subjects, after
training the knowledge level of the high and low LSH subjects was
equivalent.262
Moreover, the training video affected the touching behavior of high
LSH subjects. Without training, high LSH subjects were more likely than
low LSH subjects to engage in inappropriate touching of the female
confederate during the putting session. 263 Those high LSH subjects who
viewed the harassment training video, however, were no more likely than
their low LSH counterparts to engage in such touching behavior.2 6
Finally, the study tested for the effects of the training video on the long
term attitudes of those with a high propensity to harass. Unfortunately,
viewing the harassment video did not affect long term attitudes associated
with the propensity to harass.
265
These mixed results are thought provoking and instructive. On the one
hand, it is heartening to learn that a training video may positively affect the
knowledge and, at least in the short term, the touching behavior of those
individuals most likely to harass others. Such news is tempered, however,
by the inability of the video to alter entrenched attitudes associated with the
propensity to harass. To truly eliminate workplace harassment in the long
term, it may be necessary to use alternative training methods.266 Perry and
her colleagues suggest that experiential techniques such as role playing and
group discussion may prove effective in bringing about attitude change.267
Another recent study, however, casts some doubt on the ability of those
participating in experiential programs to translate the training into their own
260. Id. at 712.
261. Id.




266. Id. at 716.
267. Id.
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organizational interactions.268 Joann Keyton and Steven Rhodes' study
sought, among other things, to confirm a central conceptual foundation of
most training programs: that participants in anti-discrimination training will
rely on their empathic skills and apply what they experience in training to
their subsequent encounters with others in the workplace. 269 Since empathic
ability is the key to an experiential approach to training, Keyton and Rhodes
posited that those subjects in their study with high empathic abilities would
identify the greatest "percentage of flirting and sexually harassing verbal
and nonverbal cues" in the four videotaped scenarios they were shown.
27 If
correct, noted the study authors, such a finding could validate the use of
role playing and other experiential techniques in sexual harassment training
programs.271
Keyton and Rhodes examined the degree to which empathy scores
predicted the proper identification of four types of social-sexual behaviors
depicted in the videotapes: verbal flirting cues, non-verbal flirting cues,
verbal harassment cues, and non-verbal harassment cues.272 Empathic
ability significantly predicted identification of only one type of cue-verbal
harassment cues.273 In contrast, empathic ability was not a statistically
significant factor in the identification of verbal flirting, non-verbal flirting,
and non-verbal harassment. 274 Keyton and Rhodes describe these results as
weak support for their hypothesis.275
These findings challenge the commonly held training assumption that
employees will translate what they view or hear in seminars to their
organizational encounters.276 The study authors note that "[e]mpathy does
not appear to enable employees to identify sexual harassment. 277 Thus, in
developing programs, trainers should not rely on role playing to inform or
instruct trainees about sexual harassment. Role plays, if enlisted as a
pedagogical tool, should only be used to provide examples of harassment
and "to describe what to do if harassed.
278
Similarly weak support for the notion that trainees will retain and
translate what they learn in sexual harassment training is found in another
recent study.279 James Wilkerson's research examined, inter alia, the effect
268. Keyton & Rhodes, supra note 136, at 170.
269. Id. at 162.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 166-67.
273. Id. at 167.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 170.
276. Id. at 167.
277. Id. at 170.
278. Id. at 168.
279. See James M. Wilkerson, The Impact of Job Level and Prior Training on Sexual Harassment
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of prior training on the ability or tendency to label behavior as
harassment.28 ° Wilkerson hypothesized that if trainees assimilate what they
learn in training, they should be able to label sexual harassment more
readily than the untrained.28'
One fourth of the study participants reported that they had previously
attended formal, sexual harassment training.28 2 Thus, Wilkerson's research
differs from the studies described above. The subjects in Wilkerson's study
were not trained as part of the research, and those who were trained
previously had attended programs some time before they participated in his
study.
Wilkerson's subjects, employees of various ranks in a janitorial
services company, watched two videotaped scenarios. One scene depicted
a weak harassment situation; the other modeled a strong harassment
incident. After each depiction, the participants filled out a labeling scale. 83
The study found that prior training did not significantly affect participants'
labeling of behaviors as sexual harassment when the ratings of both
scenarios were considered together.2 4 When the scenario ratings were
analyzed separately, "trained participants did not distinguish themselves
from the untrained in identifying sexual harassment in the weak scenario
and, in fact, had a lower mean labeling score." '285 Training was a significant
rating factor, however, in the rating of the strong scenario. 86 Wilkerson
concluded that his hypothesis therefore received only partial support.287
Indeed, the results "were variable enough to raise questions about sexual
harassment training's retention and transfer.
288
The studies discussed thus far examined the ability of sexual
harassment training to bring about positive responses from trainees. There
remains the question, however, of whether such training can cause backlash
effects in participants. One study provides some evidence that sexual
harassment training can produce effects that are far from affirmative.
In a study analyzing the problems confronting women attorneys in
eight large New York City law firms, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and her
colleagues found that sexual harassment training produced a chilling effect
Labeling and Remedy Choice, 29 J. OF APP. Soc. PSYCH. 1605 (1999).
280. Id. at 1607.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1610.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1611-12.
285. Id. at 1613.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1617.
288. Id. at 1619.
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on senior male partners. 289 The study authors discovered that sensitivity
training made the men wary of contacts with the young women associates
with whom they work. This caution, in turn, served to restrict mentoring
opportunities for the new lawyers that are essential to the development of
legal skills.
29 °
Anecdotal evidence provides support for a different type of harassment
training backlash: anger about having been made to participate in the
program. The Federal Aviation Administration's sexual harassment
training program so upset one male traffic controller that he brought a
sexual harassment suit against the agency.29' In that case the participants
were required to engage in a role reversal exercise wherein male employees
were made to walk a gauntlet of female employees, some of whom touched
the men's bodies.
In another case, a man who was fired for refusing to attend mandatory
sexual harassment training sued his employer for religious and sex
discrimination.292 A third discrimination suit was brought by several
women, two of whom argued in part that they were "subjected to sexist
cartoons" during mandatory sexual harassment sensitivity training. 93
These anecdotes and the scant empirical evidence described above
should give pause to those who wholeheartedly endorse training as a
foolproof antidote to workplace sexual harassment. An undiscerning view
of the value of such programs may stymie the achievement of workplace
equality. In other words, seeing all such training as positive may make the
goal of these programs-the elimination of harassment-that much harder
to achieve.
Social scientists have only in the last few years begun to assess the
effects of sexual harassment training programs. The results of these early
studies are highly inconclusive. While there is some slim evidence that
training increases the sensitivity of trainees to possible instances of
harassment,294 the conclusion that trainees become more expert at
identifying harassment is debatable.2 95 While there is slim evidence that
training, at least in a laboratory setting, may positively affect inappropriate
touching behavior by men with a high propensity to harass, that same
289. Epstein, supra note 19, at 376-77.
290. Id.
291. Hartman v. Pena, 914 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ill. 1995); see also Gutek, supra note 224, at 195
("[O]ne problem with mandatory training is that it creates resentment and may result in very little
learning.").
292. Wolff v. City of N.Y. Fin. Svcs. Agency, 939 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
293. Gates v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:96-CV-2198-D, 1998 WL 133004 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18,
1998).
294. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
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training did not affect their long term attitudes. 296 Finally, that trainees will
be able to retain knowledge and transfer it to their workplace encounters is
entirely uncertain. 297  There is, in light of currently available research,
absolutely no scientific basis for concluding that harassment training fosters
employee tolerance and greatly alters workplace culture.
Moreover, the risks associated with ineffective training programs-
backlash, sending the wrong message, and creating the erroneous
impression that "something is being done about harassment"-are too
potentially destructive to tolerate. Thus, as will be discussed in Section V,
no training program should be considered relevant in litigation unless, in
the context of a given dispute, it is demonstrably effective.
B. The Possible Effects of Diversity Training
There is even less empirical data on the effects of diversity training
than there is on sexual harassment training programs. As one of the rare
recent studies noted, "there have only been a few empirical evaluations of
the outcomes of diversity training .... [and t]he research in this area is both
inconsistent and incomplete." '298 Additionally, most of those isolated
empirical efforts are rather dated. 99 Indeed, the most comprehensive of the
studies was published in 1982 before the Hudson Institute's "Workforce
2000" report ushered in the modem era of diversity training.3" That early
study concluded that a three-day workshop designed to combat sexist
attitudes had little measurable impact.301
Jeanne Hanover and Douglas Cellar recently published a revealing
field study on the effects of a diversity training workshop on middle
managers at a consumer products corporation.30 2 More specifically, the
investigation sought to assess the workshop's impact on trainees'
perceptions of their own behavior, as well as their ratings of the importance
of diversity-related management practices.30 3 Ninety-nine middle managers
participated in the study, with approximately half attending the workshop
and the other half serving as the control group.3" All the study subjects
296. See supra notes 252-65 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
298. Jeanne M. B. Hanover & Douglas Cellar, Environmental Factors and the Effectiveness of
Workforce Diversity Training, 9 HUMAN RES. DEV. Q. 105, 107 (1998).
299. See, e.g., J.H. Katz & A. Ivey, White Awareness: The Frontier of Racism Awareness Training,
55 PERS. & GUIDANCE J. 485 (1977).
300. See M.D. Dunnette & S.J. Motowidlo, Estimating Benefits and Costs of Antisexist Training
Programs in Organizations, in WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE 156 (H.J. Bernardin, ed. 1982).
301. Id.
302. Hanover & Cellar, supra note 298, at 105.
303. Id. at 109.
304. Id. at 110.
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completed a pre- and post-training questionnaire, which asked them to
evaluate the extent to which they performed thirty-eight diversity-related
behaviors and to rate the importance of each behavior.30 5 Hanover and
Cellar's hypothesis that trainees would see themselves as engaging in
diversity-related management practices to a greater extent than the control
group was supported.3"6 Similarly, trainees rated the importance of
diversity-related management practices higher than did those in the control
group.
30 7
While their results appear encouraging, Hanover and Cellar
acknowledge a number of limitations of the study.3" 8 One striking
limitation was the study authors' use of self-report measures of behavior.3"
As compared with the reviews of others, self-reports tend to be inflated,
have less variability, and are influenced by what subjects consider to be
socially desirable responses.310 Stated simply, the study results cannot tell
us whether the trainees' behavior really changed or they simply thought
and/or said it did.31'
Moreover, given the differences in both diversity training programs
themselves and the reasons why organizations opt for such training,
Hanover and Cellar caution that "[i]t would be unfounded.. .to assume that
the results obtained in this study could be expected from all diversity
programs."3 2 Thus, while the study is an important first step in diversity
research, it can hardly be said to constitute empirical support for the
premise that diversity training prevents or curbs invidious workplace
discrimination. In fact, a recent field survey of 785 human resource
professionals, a group heavily invested in the promotion of diversity
training, found only modest assessments of the long-term success of their
programs.31 3 Only thirty-three percent of the respondents described their
programs as either quite or extremely successful.3 14 About half of the
programs were believed to produce a neutral or mixed effect.3 5 Eighteen
305. Id.
306. Id. at 114-15.
307. Id. at 113-14.
308. These limitations include the nonrandom assignment of participants to training groups and a
small sample size. Id. at 119; see also Ruby L. Beale, Invited Reaction: Response to Environmental
Factors and the Effectiveness of Workforce Diversity Training, 9 HUMAN RES. DEV. Q. 125-26 (1998)
(reviewing the Hanover and Cellar study and raising concern about how participants were assigned to
training sessions).
309. Hanover & Cellar, supra note 298, at 120.
310. Id.
311. Id. Hanover & Cellar note that they designed the study to try to minimize the problems
associated with self-reports. Id.
312. Id. at 121.
313. Rynes & Rosen, supra note 182, at 258, 263.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 258.
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percent of the respondents reported that their training was largely or
extremely ineffective.3"6 Of course, these subjective assessments, while
interesting, are subject to the same potential self-reporting bias noted in the
Hanover and Cellar study, and may not at all reflect reality.3" 7
Two other recent academic articles also merit consideration. Both are
instructive in raising concerns that poorly conducted diversity training can
do more harm than good. In the first study, Catherine Ellis and Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld examined three corporate diversity training programs.3"8 As
part of their general analysis of such programs, the authors offer some
important warnings. First they counsel against the all too common brief or
"one shot" program.31 9 Training that raises controversial issues, and that
takes place in just a few hours or over the course of one day, can actually
increase employee hostility and misunderstanding.32 °
Next, they caution that efforts to increase cultural understanding can
unintentionally bolster pre-existing group stereotypes or produce new
stereotypes.32 This effect is especially likely to occur where trainers
attempt, in a positive fashion, to illuminate the differences between groups.
Ellis and Sonnenfeld also note that poorly executed programs can inspire
the resentment of white males.322
Finally, Ellis and Sonnenfeld bemoan the fact that employers that
engage in diversity training rarely conduct studies of the effects of their
efforts.323 While employers may ask training participants to complete
workshop evaluations, seldom are post-training worker attitudes assessed
organization-wide.3 24  Nor do employers usually examine the effect of
diversity training on the career mobility of members of protected groups.325
The authors call for study of the relationship between diversity
interventions and actual organizational change and argue that monitoring is
essential to an effective program.326
In another article, Deborah Plummer outlines the objectives that can
316. Id.
317. Id. at 266.
318. Ellis & Sonnenfeld, supra note 17, at 80.
319. Id. at 83. The Rynes and Rosen field survey found that "the vast majority of [diversity]
training programs (72%) last a day or less .. " Rynes & Rosen, supra note 182, at 257.
320. Ellis & Sonnenfeld, supra note 17, at 80; see also Lindsley, supra note 173, at 308 (warning
that "one shot" training increases the occurrence of backlash).
321. Id. at 86-87.
322. Id. at 87.
323. Id. at 102; see also Lindsley, supra note 173, at 308 ("Developing measurable criteria for
program evaluation often is neglected."); Wentling & Palma-Rivas, supra note 172, at 250 (noting that
long term follow-up evaluation is necessary if training is to succeed).
324. The assessment of worker attitudes is subject to the same self-reporting limitations that were
discussed above. See supra notes 309-1 1 and accompanying text.
325. Ellis & Sonnenfeld, supra note 17, at 102.
326. Id. at 102.
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and cannot be achieved through diversity programs . 27 Plummer advocates
diversity training as a way to promote awareness of different cultural
identities, to open dialogue about diversity issues, and to facilitate
examination of the cultural norms of an organization.3 21 She frankly admits,
however, that diversity training cannot make members of culturally diverse
groups like one another. Nor can it eradicate racism, sexism, or bias against
members of protected groups.329
These warnings, issued by academics, echo the thoughts of some in the
business community, including a number of professional diversity
trainers.330  Moreover, anecdotes recounted in the popular press also
indicate that some diversity training can produce negative effects. In one
reported instance, for example, white male managers, in a diversity training
session, were encouraged to articulate stereotypes about women.33 Female
and minority participants were, in this same case, asked to express their
feelings about workplace exclusion. 32 One day after the session, this
particular office was in an uproar. The men were taunting the women about
their comments in the session, and the women were angry and upset about
what the men had said during the training program.33
Given the problems associated with diversity training, members of the
legal profession should be circumspect about the place of such training in
legal practice. Incorporating diversity training into a settlement agreement,
for example, may not be the best way to promote cultural change in an
organization. In addition, the fact that an employer has provided diversity
training to its employees may not tell us much about the work environment
the employees confront. Finally, training should not, without a careful
analysis of the particular program and its effects, be accepted as evidence
that a given work environment was non-discriminatory or that the employer
made good faith efforts to eradicate bias.
C. Attitude Polarization as a Possible Byproduct of Anti-Discrimination
Training
In addition to studies examining the specific effects associated with
327. Plummer, supra note 180, at 183-85.
328. Id. at 182-83.
329. Id. at 184.
330. E.g., Karp & Sutton, supra note 112, at 33 (noting that poorly conceptualized diversity
training can produce "polarization" between groups); Mobley, supra note 152, at 45 (noting that an
"incompetent or unqualified practitioner can create backlash"); Hemphill, supra note 111, at S5
("Diversity training, in fact, fueled the fires of a national backlash."); Murray, supra note 120, at C5
(discussing the resentment and backlash engendered by some diversity training programs).
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sexual harassment and diversity training, there are studies of general social
psychological phenomena that may be relevant when considering the utility
of anti-discrimination training. One particularly interesting phenomenon is
attitude polarization, which is defined as the tendency to harden and
become more extreme in one's views after thinking about and evaluating
evidence on a particular subject.334 For example, in one widely acclaimed
study opponents and proponents of the death penalty were presented with
evidence both supporting and undermining the argument for capital
punishment.335 After reviewing the mixed evidence, the study subjects
reported that their attitudes had strengthened in the direction of their initial
views, further increasing the gap between death penalty supporters and
opponents.336 The obvious question is whether this phenomenon might be
operative regarding information presented during sexual harassment and
diversity training.
One recent study sheds light on whether attitude polarization might
constitute a byproduct of anti-discrimination training programs. Geoffrey
Munro and Peter Ditto examined the reactions of their study subjects to
fictitious scientific information both confirming and negating stereotypes
about homosexuality. 337 In their first experiment, persons pre-selected as
high and low in their bias toward gays were presented with two fake studies
of homosexuality: one study concluded that homosexuality was associated
with psychopathology, and the other demonstrated that homosexuality was
not associated with psychopathology.338
Munro and Ditto sought to measure their subjects' actual and
perceived attitudes. Actual attitudes were assessed both before and after
exposure to the information by a survey that evaluated the subjects' beliefs
about homosexuality. A measure of the participants' perceived attitudes
was obtained by asking the subjects to self-report on the issue of whether
the fictitious scientific information had changed or altered their attitudes.
Interestingly, Munro and Ditto concluded that no actual attitude
polarization had occurred; that is the authors found the subjects' initial
attitude assessment of homosexuality to be consistent with their post-
exposure attitude assessment.3 9 Nonetheless, participants perceived their
334. Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure,
Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. OF PERS. & SOC.
PSYCH. 561 (1993).
335. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. OF PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979).
336. Id. at 2105.
337. Geoffrey D. Munro & Peter H. Ditto, Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in
Reactions to Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 636 (1997).
338. Id. at 639.
339. Id. at 641. This result is in accordance with a study done by Arthur Miller and his colleagues,
whose experiments studied polarization regarding the presentation of materials on capital punishment
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initial attitudes as becoming more extreme after exposure to the fictitious
studies on homosexuality. 4 The perceived polarization was operative,
however, only with respect to the subjects' general attitudes about gays-
whether or not they were accepting of homosexuality generally-and not
their specific beliefs on whether homosexuality is associated with
psychopathology.34
In a second experiment, Munro and Ditto replicated the format of the
first experiment but conducted it using subjects representing the entire
range of biased attitudes toward gays, not just those deemed high and low
in prejudice. Again, actual attitude polarization was not discerned.
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Experiment two did reveal, however, an interesting phenomenon with
respect to perceived attitude. As the prejudice level of the subjects
increased from low to high, participants self-reported that their exposure to
the fictitious studies produced "more change toward unaccepting attitudes
about homosexuality. 343 In other words, the higher the prejudice level of
the subject, the more likely that subject was to perceive that the information
presented precipitated a negative change in attitude.
Munro and Ditto note that while actual attitude polarization was not
produced by exposure to the mixed scientific information, "neither were
preexisting attitudes moderated in any way." 344 The subjects came through
both experiments with their views firmly entrenched and, in some cases,
feeling that those attitudes were strengthened. This conclusion may bode ill
for the ability of anti-discrimination training to ameliorate stereotypical
attitudes toward members of protected groups. Whether and how these
attitudes might translate into conduct that employers seek to eliminate
through educational programs is an open question. Thus, field studies of
the effects of training are desperately needed.
A variant of the polarization phenomenon is group polarization, a
phenomenon that occurs when an individual's attitude polarizes during
discussion with people who hold like views. 345  Some two-hundred
laboratory and field studies demonstrate this effect. Individual attitudes
about a particular subject become more extreme during group discussion so
long as all discussants are similarly inclined.346
and affirmative action. Miller, supra note 334, at 572. Miller's study found no polarization regarding
actual attitude change. Id.
340. Munro & Ditto, supra note 337, at 641.
341. Id. at 643.
342. Id. at 645.
343. Id. at 646.
344. Id. at 649.
345. See generally Markus Brauer et al., The Effects of Repeated Expressions on Attitude
Polarization During Group Discussions, 68 J. of PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 1014 (1995).
346. Id. at 1015.
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Explanations for this phenomenon tend to be group oriented.
Polarization occurs in part because group discussion leads to a sharing of
arguments that enlarges each individual's pool of supportive arguments that
justify his or her views."' Additionally, when individuals realize that
others share their attitudes, they typically want their colleagues to view
them as more committed to those views than the average supporter.348
Recent work by Markus Brauer and his colleagues provides a third
explanation. Their experiments demonstrated that an individual's repeated
attitude expression alone can produce a polarization effect.349 Thus, the
more an individual repeats an attitude, the more firmly the person comes to
believe what he or she is saying.
These studies bring into question a not uncommon practice in diversity
training: separating training groups by gender, race and other ethnicity. To
the extent that members of a homogenous group share attitudes antithetical
to anti-discrimination training, they may, through discussion, harden the
beliefs that employer-sponsored training endeavors to eliminate.
V.
CONCLUSION: FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT TRAINING
The empirical and anecdotal evidence discussed in the last section
renders the legal profession's reflexive and undiscerning endorsement of
anti-discrimination training highly suspect. While the desire to find a
"quick fix" for the problem of employment discrimination is
understandable, that educational efforts positively affect entrenched bias is
a hypothesis that has yet to be proven. Moreover, the negative byproducts
of incompetently performed training-backlash, misinformation, and the
illusion that discrimination is being meaningfully addressed-make the
recent turn in Title VII jurisprudence, away from compensation and towards
educational efforts, a matter of great concern.
Until we know much more about anti-discrimination training and its
effects, the existence of sexual harassment or diversity programs should not
be considered a fact relevant to employer liability for compensatory
damages in any discrimination suit.350 To allow a corporate practice with
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See id at 1026.
350. Theresa Beiner makes a similar suggestion about employer preventative efforts in sexual
harassment cases, arguing that such efforts are only relevant at the punitive damage stage. See Theresa
M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on
Imputing Liability for Sexual Harassment 78-80 (paper presented at Law & Society Association Annual
Meeting, Miami, 2000). Professor Beiner notes that her approach "strikes a balance between the
compensatory nature of Title VII and the policy of encouraging employers to address and correct sexual
harassment." Id. at 79.
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only speculative value to influence the make whole recovery of, for
example, an employee injured by a racially hostile environment, is too
destructive of employee rights to be countenanced. Sexual harassment and
diversity programs are general preventative efforts undertaken by
employers, easily "decoupled from day-to-day organizational activity."
'351
Thus, the existence of anti-discrimination training tells us little about the
particular workplace conditions encountered by discrimination plaintiffs.
On the other hand, evidence of training efforts may be relevant to the
issue of punitive damages. 52 Specifically, educational efforts may bear
upon whether "the employer's good-faith efforts to prevent discrimination
in the workplace" prohibit the imposition of vicarious liability for punitive
relief, the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Kolstad.35 3 Those
considering such evidence, however, must be exceedingly careful. Indeed,
in reviewing the relevancy of educational programs, or, for that matter,
considering the incorporation of training into settlement agreements, three
principles must be kept in mind.
First, conducting training cannot be equated with fostering cultural
change. Social scientists note that employers that want to rectify
discriminatory environments must tie training to specific organizational
policies and systems designed to accomplish the task.354 For example, an
employer that wishes to eliminate glass ceilings would carefully analyze
and perhaps revise career paths, train supervisors about the issue, and
institute a system of rewards for achieving diversity goals.355 Judges and
juries should be reluctant to credit employers for educational efforts that are
not "reinforced by policies, activities, and incentives within the
organization.1
356
Second, no training regimen should be wholeheartedly embraced or
considered relevant before a meaningful assessment of its features and
purported impact has been conducted. The training literature has begun to
detail characteristics that should be incorporated into all training
programs.357 Common recommendations include obtaining a "visible
351. Edelman & Petterson, supra note 84, at 114.
352. Professor Beiner likewise finds training programs to be highly relevant at the punitive damage
phase. Beiner, supra note 350, at 79-80.
353. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 546.
354. Lee Ann Hollister et al., Diversity Programs: Key to Competitiveness or Just Another Fad?,
11 ORGANIZATION DEV. J. 49, 58 (1993).
355. Id.
356. Beale, supra note 308, at 126-27. It should be noted that the Kolstad Court failed to describe
the good faith safe harbor as an affirmative defense that must be proven by the employer. Belton, supra
note 70, at 205-06. Nonetheless, the discussion in this Article assumes that it is the employer, and not
the employee, who has the burden of proof on the good faith issue.
357. E.g., Anne Perkins Delatte & Larry Baytos, Guidelines for Successful Diversity Training,
TRAINING, Jan. 1993, at 55; Herff L. Moore et al., Eight Steps to a Sexual Harassment-Free Workplace,
2001]
46 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 22:1
commitment [to training] from top leaders," eschewing one shot training
courses, selecting qualified facilitators, and carefully assembling participant
groups to avoid both homogeneity and tokenism." 8 Also vitally important
are mechanisms for long-term program evaluation.3 9 Employers proffering
evidence of educational efforts should be required to describe their courses'
designs and the methods by which they gauge program outcomes.36 °
Finally, training, in order to be relevant to the issue of employer good
faith, must be considered in context with the events that give rise to the suit.
An employer may conduct training that appears successful on an
organization-wide basis and yet is obviously ineffective as applied to the
part of the organization in which the plaintiff works. The training, in such a
case, should not be dispositive evidence of good faith. Similarly, a
corporate educational program may appear effective overall but the
employer's response to the plaintiff's discrimination complaint may
nevertheless be defensive and inappropriate. The program, in this example,
should not bar the imposition of punitive damages.
3 61
A good example of a contextual analysis of training relevancy can be
found in a recent Fourth Circuit opinion. In Lowery v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., the Fourth Circuit considered the propriety of an award of punitive
damages in a race discrimination case.362 Circuit City proffered evidence of
its good faith efforts to educate its employees about its anti-discrimination
policy, focusing specifically on a week-long managerial and supervisory
training seminar entitled "Managing Through People," a small portion of
which covered federal anti-discrimination laws.3 63  Those efforts proved
TRAINING AND DEV., Apr. 1. 1998, at 12; Ellis & Sonnenfeld, supra note 17, at 101-02; Mobley, supra
note 152, at 45; Paskoff, supra note 220, at 42; Segal, supra note 220, at 129.
358. Ellis & Sonnenfeld, supra note 17, at 101.
359. Rynes & Rosen, supra note 182, at 253; Wentling & Palma-Rivas, supra note 172, at 246; see
also Grundmann et al., supra note 226, at 182 (offering a list of methodological considerations for
evaluating training programs).
360. One reason employers are reluctant to evaluate their training programs is fear that the findings
could be used against them in subsequent discrimination litigation. Indeed my colleagues working in the
social sciences note that it has become incredibly difficult to convince employers to open their doors to
professional researchers. Creating an evidentiary safe harbor for employers and providing an academic
research privilege for social scientists could ameliorate the concerns of employers and encourage
professional field research on anti-discrimination training. See generally Kathleen M. Blee, The Perils
of Privilege, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 993 (1999); Felice J. Levine & John M. Kennedy, Promoting a
Scholar's Privilege: Accelerating the Pace, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 967 (1999); Robert H.
McLaughlin, From the Field to the Courthouse: Should Social Science Research be Privileged? 24 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 927 (1999); Robert H. McLaughlin, Privilege and Practice in Social Science Research,
24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999 (1999); Rebecca Emily Rapp, In Re Cusumano and the Undue Burden of
Using the Journalist Privilege as a Model for Protecting Researchers from Discovery, 29 J.L. & EDUC.
265 (2000); Sudhir Venkatesh, The Promise of Ethnograhic Research: The Researcher's Dilemma, 24
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (1999).
361. l owe these examples and my thinking on this subject to the insights of Linda Krieger.
362. 206 F.3d 431 (2000).
363. Id. at 445.
JURISPRUDENCE OF PREVENTION
unavailing to the employer due to evidence that the company was
permeated by racism at the highest levels and that African-American
employees feared reprisal for complaining about discrimination.364 The
court noted that this latter evidence "called into question" the "sincerity of
Circuit City's commitment to a company-wide policy against racial
discrimination."
365
Some may argue that observing the three principles described above
imposes too great a burden on employers. To do otherwise, however, is not
only to refuse to face the truth about anti-discrimination educational
programs; it is to endorse a form over substance approach to effectuating
Title VII's preventative purpose. In Kolstad, the Supreme Court adopted
the safe harbor concept to avoid "[d]issuading employers from
implementing programs or policies to prevent discrimination. 366 If we
really seek to encourage such efforts, only those employers interested in
meaningfully addressing employment bias should be granted shelter from
punitive damages. 367
364. Id.
365. Id. at 446.
366. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545.
367. The warnings in this Article about misplaced faith in anti-discrimination training echo the
cautionary words of Craig Haney and Aida Hurtado in another context. They argue that excessive faith
in standardized employment tests diverts "public and political attention away from the structural
legacies of slavery and racism." See Craig Haney & Aida Hurtado, The Jurisprudence of Race and
Meritocracy, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 223, 244 (1994).
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